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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, unions have turned increasingly to
strategies outside the traditional framework of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA").' Frustrated by an ineffective NLRA legal regime2 and the
demise of the economic strike, 3 organized labor has pursued coordinated
approaches in order to generate extended economic pressure on private
employers who seek to avoid recognizing unions or to resist bargaining
collective agreements. Coordinated campaign tactics include publicity
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). I use "NLRA" to refer to the
1935 statute as amended in 1947 and 1959.
2. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527,
1533-38 (2002) (noting that the NLRA has remained unchanged since 1959 in the face of major
changes in labor force and the organization of the workplace); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1774-1803 (1983)
(discussing deficiencies of and remedies under the NLRA).
3. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE
USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE 1970s AND 1980s 1, 12-13, 15, 18 (1991)
(discussing the increased use of permanent replacements in economic strikes since 1980 and the
concomitant steep decline in the number of strikes); James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999
Wis. L. REV. 65, 69-72 (book review) (discussing reasons for the increased use of permanent
replacements).
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efforts aimed at attracting media attention and consumer interest;
regulatory reviews initiated to focus on a company's possible health,
safety, environmental, or zoning violations; and investigations of a
company's financial status through use of pension funds or other
shareholder resources.4 Unions relying on these comprehensive campaign
or corporate campaign strategies5 have enjoyed some success which in turn
has contributed to a modest rise in private sector union density, the first
such increase for decades.
6
Management responses to comprehensive campaigns often involve
filing lawsuits against unions and workers. Employer civil actions may
invoke state defamation law, federal labor law prohibiting secondary
boycotts, or federal antitrust law.7 But the most high-profile and dramatic
form of employer retaliation in court is lawsuits alleging a pattern of
unlawfully extortionate activities under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 8
RICO actions pose an especially potent threat to the new form of
union campaigns. There is the risk of treble damages and attorney's fees
that accompanies a finding of liability. Given the Supreme Court's track
record of construing RICO expansively in commercial disputes between
4. For a discussion of these tactics, see INDUS. UNION DEP'T, AFL-CIO, DEVELOPING NEW
TACTICS: WINNING WITH COORDINATED CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 4-10 (1985); CHARLES R. PERRY,
UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987); Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, It Takes More Than
House Calls: Organizing to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy, in ORGANIZING TO
WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 19, 29-36 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998); David
Moberg, Labor's Capital Strategies, in NOT YOUR FATHER'S UNION MOVEMENT: INSIDE THE AFL-CIO
201, 201-12 (Jo-Ann Mort ed., 1998); Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. Steen, Union "Corporate
Campaigns" as Blackmail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 784,
794-96(1999).
5. Some scholars have suggested distinctions between corporate campaigns, focused primarily
on investors and boards of directors, and comprehensive campaigns, which appeal to community groups
and the public as well. See Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Evolution of Strategic and
Coordinated Bargaining Campaigns in the 1990s: The Steelworkers' Experience, in REKINDLING THE
MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 211, 218 (Lowell
Turner, Harry C. Katz & Richard W. Hurd eds., 2001); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1605. This Article uses
the terms "comprehensive campaign" or "coordinated campaign," while recognizing that the target is
generally a single corporation.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54 (describing an increase in union membership
during 2007 and 2008).
7. See Maurice Baskin & Herbert R. Northrup, The Impact ofBE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB
on Employer Responses to Union Corporate Campaigns and Related Tactics, 19 LAB. LAW. 215, 217-
19 (2003) (discussing employer actions against unions under Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA") and under state defamation law); Paul More, Protections Against Retaliatory
Employer Lawsuits After BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 220-21
(2004) (discussing employer actions against unions under antitrust law).
8. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
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business parties, this risk is not trivial.9 In addition, the very existence of a
RICO claim can have an adverse impact on a union's reputation in light of
RICO's established association with images of organized crime, corruption,
and violence. Employers began using RICO against unions during labor-
management disputes in the late 1980s, and litigation has continued as
comprehensive campaigns have attracted greater attention.10 For union
campaigns lacking any substantial element of violence, RICO lawsuits
have a mixed record in strictly legal terms.1' However, the RICO strategy
has been effective in pressuring unions to reduce or abandon
comprehensive campaign activities-due to the risks identified above, the
substantial costs and delays accompanying complex civil litigation, and the
shift in focus from employees' workplace concerns to court-centered legal
disputes. 12
Applicability of RICO to ordinary labor-management disputes raises
interpretive questions regarding a major federal statute that has been
heavily criticized but lightly amended. When RICO was drafted and
enacted, Congress did not anticipate its widespread injection into routine
business controversies or traditional labor-management relations.' 3 With
respect to RICO litigation between businesses, however, the Supreme
Court decided early on that the expansive language of the law, rather than
the narrower intent of Congress, is what controls. 14 The Court also has
made clear that even if employers sue unions in retaliation for legitimate
union activity, a retaliatory motive does not necessarily make such
litigation unlawful under the NLRA.15
Starting in the mid-1980s, members of Congress complained
vociferously about the sweeping application of RICO to private parties in
ordinary commercial disputes far removed from organized crime. 16 And
Supreme Court Justices have invited-even urged--Congress to revise the
statutory language. 17 Although Congress did enact a limited amendment
9. See infra Part II.C (discussing expansive Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s).
10. See infra Part II.D (discussing lower court litigation from the late 1980s to the present).
11. See infra Part II.D (discussing outcomes in terms of surviving motions to dismiss).
12. See More, supra note 7, at 221-22; Adam Liptak, A Corporate View of Mafia Tactics:
Protesting, Lobbying and Citing Upton Sinclair, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at A14.
13. See infra Part II.B (discussing RICO's legislative origins).
14. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985); Haroco Inc. v. Am. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1984), affdper curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
15. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536-37 (2002).
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing the legislative history accompanying efforts at RICO reform
from 1986 to 1998).
17. See infra Part III.A (discussing invitations in Supreme Court opinions and a speech by then-
Chief Justice William Rehnquist).
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addressing securities fraud as a small part of a securities reform package in
1995,18 the key RICO text remains essentially unchanged from 1970 and
RICO reform is unlikely to occur in the near future. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court in a series of more recent cases has adopted interpretations
of civil RICO that are distinctly constraining when compared with the
Court's first generation of decisions.
There is a lively current debate concerning possible revisions to the
NLRA, but a "RICO fix" for labor-management disputes will not be part of
any labor law reform package to emerge from Congress.' 9 Thus, if RICO's
application to union comprehensive campaigns is to be clarified, appellate
courts and ultimately the Supreme Court will have to undertake that task in
the face of prolonged legislative inaction. This Article suggests how federal
courts should engage in such a clarification, building from key "second
generation" Supreme Court RICO decisions in which the Justices have
narrowed the scope of private civil liability.
The Article focuses on employer complaints alleging that a series of
nonviolent pressure tactics used in union comprehensive campaigns may
constitute extortion, one of the core predicate offenses actionable under
civil RICO. In determining the applicability of extortion as a predicate
offense, civil RICO implicates questions of meaning and scope under a
separate but incorporated criminal statute, the Hobbs Act. The relevant
statutory definition of extortion, taken from the Hobbs Act, is "the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right.",20 Employers and their advocates contend that when unions bring
multiple regulatory actions before agencies and courts, and communicate
disparaging information about the company to customers, shareholders, and
the public-all designed to injure an employer's business reputation and
goodwill while making clear the union's willingness to negotiate on these
matters in the context of the employer's agreement to certain labor relations
requests-the pattern of harassing conduct qualifies as extortion under
RICO.
2 1
18. See infra Part III.A (discussing the text and legislative history of 1995 securities reform
legislation).
19. See S. 560, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (proposing the Employee Free Choice Act, which does not
address RICO in any form); H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. (2009) (same).
20. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (emphases added). RICO defines "racketeering activity"
to include any activities or conduct indictable under the Hobbs Act and authorizes private civil damages
actions for persons injured by such racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(l), 1962, 1964(c).
21. See, e.g., Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 5-15, Smithfield
Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No.
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The argument supporting extortion raises a number of distinct and
contested legal questions. First, how, if at all, does a union "obtain
property" from an employer when engaged in this type of comprehensive
campaign? Second, assuming property is obtained from the employer,
induced by a fear of economic loss, in what circumstances is that
inducement "wrongful"? Third, apart from whether the union's goals or
objectives are wrongful, to what extent are certain means employed by the
union presumptively protected from federal liability under the First
Amendment? Finally, under what circumstances might the union's overall
campaign be deemed actionable as a form of "death by a thousand cuts," 22
even if the individual incidents or activities are generally lawful?
The Article proposes answers to each of these questions, relying
principally on two recent Supreme Court decisions construing RICO, as
well as an earlier decision interpreting the Hobbs Act and an extended line
of Court cases reconciling federal regulation with expressive activity. The
Article maintains that the key employer rights at stake in a union
comprehensive campaign-the rights to control procedural and substantive
approaches to union recognition or collective bargaining-may qualify as
intangible property rights, but they are not "obtainable property" as that
concept has been applied under RICO and the Hobbs Act. An employer's
exclusive control over the recognition or bargaining processes is not a
commercially valuable business asset that can be transferred to a union to
exercise or sell. The Article then contends that a union's use of fear of
economic loss as an inducement is not "wrongful" so long as the union is
pursuing legitimate labor objectives. Whether a union's economic
objectives are legitimate is largely a function of federal labor law, and the
union's typical objectives in a comprehensive campaign setting-a
collective bargaining agreement for a majority status union, a neutrality
agreement, or an agreement for voluntary recognition based on card
majority status-are entirely lawful under the NLRA.
Moving beyond these two definitional questions, the Article also
argues that construing RICO to penalize the main techniques employed by
unions in these campaigns-dissemination of negative information and
petitioning courts or regulatory agencies-would raise serious concerns
under the First Amendment. Neither the right to free speech nor the right to
petition government is unqualified: union speech loses protection if it is
knowingly or recklessly false while union lawsuits or regulatory complaints
3:07CV641); Northrup & Steen, supra note 4, at 803-11, 817-28.
22. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007).
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HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 736 2009-2010
2010] CLAIMS OF RICO EXTORTIONAGAINST UNION CAMPAIGNS 737
lack protection if they amount to "sham litigation." 23 Outside these
narrowly drawn exceptions, union expressive activities ought to be immune
from liability for extortion under RICO. Finally, the Article suggests that
assuming a union's comprehensive campaign includes a few instances of
unlawful activity, those actions should not transform a campaign based
predominantly on lawful conduct into actionable extortion. To hold
otherwise would frustrate the federal policy commitment protecting
employees' "full freedom" to organize and engage in hard bargaining with
employers under the NLRA.2 4
Part II of the Article establishes relevant background. It describes the
rise of union comprehensive campaigns, provides an overview of RICO's
legislative origins, and discusses how initial Supreme Court readings of
RICO helped trigger extensive private litigation under the Act, including a
steady stream of RICO civil actions by employers against unions. Part III
situates RICO's applicability to labor unions in the context of prolonged
congressional inaction. It discusses failed efforts at RICO reform during the
1980s and 1990s, describes how a second generation of Supreme Court
civil RICO decisions shifted from an expansive to a constraining approach,
and suggests the Court has undertaken aspects of the reform effort that
Congress was unable to accomplish. Part IV analyzes the four central legal
questions implicated in the contention that union comprehensive campaigns
constitute extortionate conduct under RICO. As part of that analysis, Part
IV explains why union comprehensive campaigns qualify as lawful "hard
bargaining" and why the federal courts should take the initiative to clarify
the law and thereby reduce the chilling effect of RICO actions.
II. BACKGROUND ON COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGNS AND RICO
A. THE RISE OF UNION COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGNS
1. Objectives and Tactics
The term "corporate campaign" was first applied in the late 1970s
when the textile workers' union relied on a range of financial linkages and
secondary pressures to help secure labor agreements with J.P. Stevens.25
23. Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (NLRA statement of purpose).
25. See PERRY, supra note 4, at 1-2; Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate
Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 505, 506 (1990).
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Subsequently, a number of unions have come to prefer the term
"comprehensive campaign."26 These campaigns may be broadly defined as
union attempts to influence company practices that affect key union
goals-securing recognition and bargaining for improved working
conditions-by generating various forms of extrinsic pressure on the
company's top policymakers z7 Tactics regularly relied on by unions
include engaging in public relations activities (such as literature
distributions, media interviews, website postings, street demonstrations, or
op-ed columns), advocating for government regulatory action (through
legislative initiatives, appeals to regulatory agencies, or lawsuits), and
targeting a firm's financial standing (by pressuring lenders and creditors,
threatening to withdraw pension fund assets, or bringing shareholder
actions).28
A 1990 empirical assessment by Paul Jarley and Cheryl Maranto
examined twenty-eight labor relations disputes between 1976 and 1988 in
which unions publicly announced they were conducting corporate
campaigns. 9 Jarley and Maranto emphasized the central role played by
conflict escalation in these campaigns: unions typically assert that the
company is unfair to organized labor in general, that the company's overall
business conduct renders it a corporate outlaw, and that the company
profits from human exploitation and misery when operating its business.
30
By enlarging the scope of a labor dispute to encompass issues of broader
social importance and public interest, unions are better able to legitimize
their own effort and to attract wider community support.
31
Jarley and Maranto found that corporate campaigns complementing
organizing drives were more likely to achieve successful results than
bargaining-related campaigns.32 One important reason for the difference is
that organizing disputes are more amenable to conflict escalation because
they tend to involve low-wage employees operating under unsafe working
26. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 507 n.2. See also Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra
note 5, at 218, 229, 234 (discussing the evolution from 1980s corporate campaigns focused on
pressuring boards of directors to more comprehensive coordinated approaches in the 1990s).
27. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN, HARRY C. KATZ & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 195-97 (1994); Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 5, at
217-34.
28. See INDUS. UNION DEP'T, supra note 4, at 4-10.
29. Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 505-06.
30. See id. at 515. See also PERRY, supra note 4, at 20-31 (elaborating on these three aspects of
conflict escalation as part of a study often corporate campaigns during late 1970s and early 1980s).
31. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 515.
32. See id. at 515-19. But see Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 5, at 217-30 (describing
three bargaining-related campaigns in the 1990s that achieved some success).
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conditions. By contrast, the possibility of invoking broader social justice
concerns is often diminished in a mature bargaining context, where
financially troubled employers seek adjustments from workers who in
relative terms are viewed as highly paid.33 A second reason for the greater
success associated with organizing-related campaigns is the more limited
nature of the union's objectives. In the organizing setting, union campaigns
typically seek neutrality agreements or comparable procedural settlements
that increase the likelihood of unionization but do not guarantee union
success. Thus, the company receives a definite benefit (an end to being the
target of consumer, stakeholder, regulatory, and public pressures) in
exchange for largely contingent costs. Again by contrast, union campaigns
aimed at securing initial or renewed collective bargaining agreements
require companies to make concrete economic concessions in order to have
the campaign terminate. 34
Since 1990, unions have expanded their use of comprehensive
campaigns, especially in connection with efforts to organize new groups of
workers. The increased emphasis reflects in part the labor movement's
commitment of substantial additional resources to organizing activities
starting in 1995.35 It also reflects organized labor's recognition that a
coordinated approach, relying on linkages to the political, regulatory,
financial, and public relations arenas, is necessary to respond to the
complex, interlocking corporate environment characteristic of the modem
American workplace. 36
33. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 515 (comparing conflict escalation in companies
employing unorganized textile workers, farmers, and nursing home workers with less successful results
at companies employing already-organized airline pilots and factory workers in the paper and meat
processing industries).
34. Seeid. at518-19.
35. See, e.g., Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO Convenes Organizing Summit to Find New Ways to
Expand Membership, [2003] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (Jan. 14, 2003) (describing a substantial
commitment of funds to organizing made by various individual unions); Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister,
Michelle Amber & Susan McGolrick, Unions Boost Funds, Develop Strategies for Organizing More
Workers, [1999] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (Aug. 18, 1999) (describing the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations' ("AFL-CIO's") goal of having its affiliated unions
expend 30 percent of their budgets on organizing, and reporting that some unions already exceed that
goal); Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO Leaders Warn Corporations That They Are Ready for a Fight, [1995]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-2 (Oct. 27, 1995) (describing the new AFL-CIO president's proposal to
create a separate organizing department that includes an office of strategic planning).
36. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, The American Labour Movement and the Resurgence in Union
Organizing, in TRADE UNIONS IN RENEWAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 32, 42, 47 (Peter Fairbrother &
Charlotte A. B. Yates eds., 2003); Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 4, at 32-34; Bronfenbrenner
& Juravich, supra note 5, at 234-35; Harry C. Katz, Rosemary Batt & Jeffrey H. Keefe, The
Revitalization of the CWA: Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 573, 576-77 (2003).
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A recent study by Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky examined what
motivates employers to negotiate organizing agreements containing
neutrality or card check provisions. 37  The authors found that most
employers they surveyed emphasized the avoidance of costs associated
with not reaching an agreement.38 Costs identified by these employers
included the fear of economically damaging demonstrations at firms open
to the public, as well as pressure from third parties (notably clients,
municipalities, union pension funds, and religious or community groups) to
withhold financial investment or customer business.39 There is ample
evidence beyond Eaton and Kriesky's database that employers are
motivated to opt for neutrality agreements and also renewed collective
bargaining arrangements through techniques that are part of a union
comprehensive campaign. Tactics associated with union success include
handbilling and picketing aimed at deterring customers,4 0 demonstrations
or interventions resulting from union partnerships with religious or
community groups,41 investigating or publicizing a company's regulatory
violations,42 and appeals to stockholders, board members, and institutional
37. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer
Motivations for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 139, 140
(Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006).
38. See id. at 144.
39. See id. at 147.
40. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 390
n. 11 (2001) (reporting that a union's threat to picket led a restaurant owner in Providence and a hotel
owner in New Haven to reach neutrality agreements); Steven Greenhouse, Local 226, "The Culinary, "
Makes Las Vegas the Land of the Living Wage, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A22 (quoting J. Terrence
Lanni, chairman of MGM Mirage, and reporting that employers' concern over "pickets and unhappy
workers blocking [hotel] driveways" led numerous Las Vegas hotel owners to agree to neutrality and
card check agreements).
41. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 2, at 1606 (describing a coordinated nationwide protest at
twenty-five Tiffany stores on behalf of mostly immigrant workers at a small jewelry company that
supplied Tiffany and noting that workers had signed cards and requested union recognition); Michelle
Amber, SEIU Sees Record Growth; 64,000 New Members Organized in 1998, 13 Lab. Rel. Week
(BNA), 1419, 1421 (Dec. 23, 1999) (describing the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU")
alliance with a Catholic cardinal to intervene in an organizing campaign at a Catholic hospital in
California); Jon Newberry, Two Labor Unions Will Charge Discrimination at Cintas, CINCINNATI
POST, Nov. 17, 2003, at 8B (reporting on a joint press conference involving the Union of Needletrades,
Industrial, and Textile Employees ("UNITE"), Teamsters, and several national civil rights groups, held
in the midst of unions' organizing campaigns, and aimed at highlighting employers' discriminatory
practices against women and minorities).
42. See Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 5, at 219-25 (discussing Steelworkers' use of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") citations, National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") charges, and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") actions against an aluminum
company and a steel company); Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing Immigrant Workers: Case
Studies from Southern California, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 99, 109 (discussing
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lenders. 43
The proliferation of comprehensive campaigns does not mean that
these new strategic approaches enjoy anything like universal success.
Unions have failed to achieve observable results in numerous campaigns
involving organizing goals' and bargaining-related objectives. 45 Even
when a union succeeds in securing recognition or negotiating a collective
bargaining agreement, it is not always clear that the comprehensive
campaign played an influential role in the result.
46
Nonetheless, comprehensive campaigns operating beyond the
traditional labor law structure have become a central element in unions'
strategic approach to both organizing and collective bargaining. The
Service Employees International Union's ("SEIU's") Justice for Janitors
campaign in large cities around the country,4 7 the Communication
Workers' efforts to organize a divested and deregulated
telecommunications industry,48  the Hotel and Restaurant Workers'
successes in Las Vegas,4 9 and the Steelworkers' campaign to restore union
SEIU's use of complaints filed with the NLRB and other government agencies protesting safety and
health violations as part of a Justice for Janitors campaign).
43. See Moberg, supra note 4, at 203-04 (describing protests and demands by activist investors
at shareholder meetings in 1998 involving Whole Foods, Crown Petroleum, ARCO, and
Columbia/HCA hospitals); Rachel Sherman & Kim Voss, "Organize or Die ": Labor's New Tactics and
Immigrant Workers, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
CALIFORNIA 81, 85 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000) (discussing the use of a "cockroach leaflet" culled from
U.S. Department of Agriculture records and presented at a stockholders meeting of a food service
company).
44. See, e.g., Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 511 (discussing a lack of results involving New
York Air, Seafirst, and Food Lion); Susan R. Hobbs, Verizon Neutrality Pact with CWA, IBEW Expires
After Four Years; No Units Organized, [2004] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-12 (Aug. 24, 2004)
(reporting no new organizing at Verizon Wireless).
45. See, e.g., Jarley & Maranto, supra note 25, at 512 (discussing union failures involving lost
recognition at Louisiana Pacific, Continental Airlines, Phelps Dodge, and International Paper, and an
inferior contract settlement at Hormel); Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 5, at 223-26 (discussing
mixed results in bargaining for a renewed contract at Bayou Steel).
46. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, UNIONS TODAY: NEW TACTICS TO TACKLE TOUGH
TIMES 70 (1985) (describing the difficulty in determining the effectiveness of corporate campaigns);
PERRY, supra note 4, at 6-7 (same); OCA W Members Ratify Pact at BASF Ending Five- Year-Old Labor
Dispute, [1989] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-7 (Dec. 20, 1989) (explaining that management viewed
the comprehensive campaign as having played no role in the contract settlement).
47. See, e.g., Roger Waldinger et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for Janitors
Campaign in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra note 4, at 102, 114-16; Susan R. Hobbs,
SEIU Members Ratify Pact with UNICCO Covering 400 University of Miami Janitors, [2006] Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-I l (Aug. 24, 2006).
48. See Katz, Batt & Keefe, supra note 36, at 577-78.
49. See Courtney Alexander, Rise to Power: The Recent History of the Culinary Union in Las
Vegas, in THE GRIT BENEATH THE GLITTER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 145, 145-75 (Hal K.
Rothman & Mike Davis eds., 2002).
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jobs at Ravenswood Aluminum 50 are among the high-profile illustrations of
how organized labor has sought to adapt its approach in light of changes in
management behavior, corporate structures, and global economic
circumstances.
Comprehensive campaigns have contributed to the first increases in
union density among private sector employers in almost three decades. The
proportion of private sector workers who belong to a union rose from 7.4
percent to 7.5 percent in 2007, ' and to 7.6 percent in 2008.52 In the
economy as a whole, union membership grew by 311,000 in 2007"3 and by
428,000 in 2008. 54 Apart from reversing a long-term trend, the modest net
increases are noteworthy because they occurred despite a substantial loss in
traditionally unionized manufacturing jobs,55 and also despite substantial
withdrawal by unions from the traditional elections process supervised by
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). 6 In sum, unions have
turned to comprehensive campaigns as a primary organizing strategy in the
twenty-first century.
2. An Archetypal Comprehensive Campaign
Unions' traditional organizing approach features direct appeals to
workers in the representation election setting, principally through leaflets,
individual and group meetings away from the worksite, and home mailings.
Their traditional approach to securing a collective bargaining agreement
includes direct pressure on employers as needed during the negotiations
50. See TOM JURAVICH & KATE BRONFENBRENNER, RAVENSWOOD: THE STEELWORKERS'
VICTORY AND THE REVIVAL OF AMERICAN LABOR (1999).
51. Michelle Amber, BLS Reports 12.1 Percent Unionization Rate in 2007; Unions Added
331,000 Members, [2008] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2008).
52. Michael Rose, Unions Added 428,000 Members in 2008 as Membership Rate Climbed to
12.4 Percent, [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Jan. 29, 2009). In 2009, however, private sector
union density fell to 7.2 percent as the recession hit unionized jobs in the private sector especially hard.
See Larry Swisher, Unions Lost 771,000 Members in 2009, as Recession Eliminated Jobs, BLS Says,
[2010] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Jan. 25, 2010).
53. Amber, supra note 51.
54. Rose, supra note 52. Private sector growth was especially strong in health services, leisure
and hospitality, and construction; the highest overall unionization in the private sector is in
telecommunications, transportation and warehousing, and utilities. See id.; Amber, supra note 51.
55. See, e.g., Number of Workers Idled by Mass Layoffs at Highest Level Since 2005, BLS
Reports, [2008] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-1 (Mar. 24, 2008) (reporting that manufacturing firms
accounted for approximately 67,000 jobs lost through mass layoffs in February 2008, over one-third of
the national total); Amber McKinney, Payrolls Declined by 4,000 Jobs in August, Led by Drops in
Construction, Manufacturing, [2007] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-1 (Sept. 10, 2007) (reporting 46,000
jobs lost in manufacturing in August 2007).
56. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 827-30 (2005) (describing the decline in NLRB elections).
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process, through employee strikes or primary picketing. By contrast, union
comprehensive campaigns engage different secondary groups-
shareholders, lenders, religious and social organizations, customers,
politicians, regulators, mass media, and the public at large-who have
varied and context-specific interactions with the employer that is the focus
of union pressure. Although it is difficult to identify any particular
comprehensive campaign as "typical," this Article posits for purposes of
subsequent analysis that the union coordinating the campaign takes a series
of initiatives.
The union is assumed to form alliances or coalitions with religious
groups and activist organizations interested in pursuing social justice or
human rights objectives.5 7 The union, either on its own or with its allies,
seeks to exert regulatory pressure on the target company by advocating for
or initiating agency action addressed to actual or reasonably believed
company violations of federal occupational safety, environmental, or
securities laws, and of state or local zoning laws. 58 The union also attempts
to impose political pressure on the company by urging federal or state
legislators to launch an investigation or hold hearings on a worker safety or
public health problem that the union reasonably believes has been created
or magnified by the company.
59
In addition, the union distributes information to various subgroups of
the public-information it reasonably believes to be accurate-that is
critical of the company's business practices. The union disseminates this
information by means of flyers and handbills to potential consumers, letters
and faxes to local newspapers and radio and television stations, public
demonstrations likely to attract media attention, and Web postings
available to employees, shareholders, customers, and the general public.
60
Finally, the union attempts to exert financial pressure on the company
through formal or informal appeals to corporate directors, submission of
policy resolutions at shareholder meetings, and proposals to move union
assets out of banks that lend money to the target company.
61
For all of these activities, the union signals that the campaign need not
57. See PERRY, supra note 4, at 31-38; Lance Compa, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and the Battle for
Labor Rights, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 314, 325-26.
58. See JURAVICH & BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 50, at 87-90; PERRY, supra note 4, at 39-
48; Charles Heckscher, Living with Flexibility, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 59,
70-71.
59. See PERRY, supra note 4, at 49-53.
60. See id. at 79-89; Milkman & Wong, supra note 42, at 109-10.
61. See PERRY, supra note 4, at 55-65, 91-102; Moberg, supra note 4, at 203-04.
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continue if the company acquiesces to the union's labor relations
objectives-to enter a neutrality agreement setting ground rules for an
organizing drive, to recognize the union once it has obtained a card
majority, or to return to the table to bargain for an extension or
modification of existing collective bargaining arrangements. The leverage
for being able to reach such an agreement is the company's fear that it will
suffer severe economic losses as a result of some combination of the
union's campaign activities. In this respect, the union campaign creates
pressure on the employer analogous to that of an economic strike.
The analogy to an economic strike also extends to the role played by
violence. As with a strike, comprehensive campaigns, especially those
involving large rallies or public demonstrations, may give rise to violent
conduct by some participants. As with a strike, the acts of violence may
themselves be independently actionable. 62 But also as with a strike,
relatively minor acts of violence incidental to the ongoing union campaign
may not give rise to liability.63
B. THE ORIGINS OF RICO AND ITS PROVISION FOR PRIVATE CIVIL
LIABILITY
1. A Focus on Organized Crime and a More Far-Reaching Text
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, culminating a three-year legislative process that began with the 1967
report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice. 64 Throughout this process, Congress's primary
concern was the problem of criminal infiltration of legitimate enterprises,
especially commercial businesses but also labor unions.65 Senators Roman
Hruska and John McClellan, who jointly introduced the Senate bill that
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 756-57 (1st Cir. 1954) (finding certain strike-
related activities to be independently actionable); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044,
1046-47 (1984) (same), enforced, Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB., 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Agency, 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 224 (2004) (finding no liability
where conduct was not sufficiently egregious). See also infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the impact of
incidental or isolated unlawful acts on the legitimacy of the overall union comprehensive campaign).
64. For two thoughtful and comprehensive treatments of RICO legislative history, see Arthur F.
Mathews, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP., BANKING & Bus.
LAW 70-126 [hereinafter ABA Report]; and Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661,666-94 (1987).
65. See Lynch, supra note 64, at 666-74 (discussing the role of the President's Commission in
publicizing the issue of organized criminal infiltration into legitimate business and precursor bills
introduced by Senator Roman Hruska in 1967 to address the issue); ABA Report, supra note 64, at 72-
83 (same).
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contained the framework and essential elements of RICO, made clear that
the bill was "designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate business
repeatedly outlined by investigations of various congressional committees"
as well as by the President's Commission.6 6 Representative Richard Poff, a
principal sponsor of RICO legislation in the House, was equally clear about
the need to attack organized crime's penetration of lawful commercial
entities. 67 The Senate and House committee reports accompanying the bills
that ultimately became the Organized Crime Control Act reiterated that
RICO's purpose was "the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce." 68 And the statement of findings and purpose included as part
of the enacted text confirms that Congress's focus was on combating
organized crime and its increasing use of "money and power.., to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions."
69
In terms of the text enacted into law, however, Congress did not limit
applicability to organized crime. Whether due to conceptual challenges,
constitutional concerns, or both, RICO's provisions target a range of
racketeering activities in which the Mafia or other organized criminal
syndicates might engage, rather than attempting to define what entities or
individuals qualify as "organized crime."7 The Act criminalizes three main
forms of activity: acquiring an interest in a legitimate enterprise through
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, acquiring an interest
in or control of a legitimate enterprise directly by means of a pattern of
racketeering activity, and conducting or participating in the operation of a
66. 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan, accompanying the introduction
of S. 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969). See also id. at 6992-93 (statement of Sen. Hruska,
accompanying the introduction of S. 1623, the Criminal Activities Profits Act of 1969) (expressing
concern that racketeers would utilize not only traditional organized crime techniques of violence and
intimidation, but also white collar business crime tactics such as embezzlement and consumer fraud to
secure control of ordinary businesses and impose serious anticompetitive injury on the economy).
67. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff, accompanying House
consideration of the bill approved by the Senate).
68. S. REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969). See also H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 57 (1970) (describing
prohibitions "aimed at stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organizations").
69. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)
(identifying that the Act's purpose is "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime").
70. See Lynch, supra note 64, at 683 (discussing tensions between viewing organized crime
narrowly as a "monolithic Italian-American conspiracy" and more broadly as a separable series of
structural criminal organizations); 116 CONG. REC. at 35,343-46 (reporting on a proposed amendment
to define the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra as "organized crime" groups, which was opposed on
constitutional grounds and defeated).
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legitimate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 7' The last of
these three prohibitions, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), goes beyond ordinary notions
of infiltration and control: it authorizes criminal prosecution when the
enterprise has been used to engage in racketeering, regardless of whether
the racketeering entity has acquired or dominated the enterprise.
72
The Act's definitions section contributes further to the broad scope of
coverage. The definition of an "enterprise" includes not only ordinary
businesses but also labor organizations and other legal entities as well as
any "group of individuals associated in fact.",73  The definition of
"racketeering activity" identifies nine typical state offenses, such as
murder, arson, robbery, and extortion, and more than seventy federal
offenses separately indictable under various sections of the U.S. Code-
including, importantly, sections addressed to mail fraud, Hobbs Act
extortion, and money laundering.74 A "pattern of racketeering activity" is
defined as requiring at least two racketeering acts that occurred within ten
years of one another. 75 The upshot of this textual approach is to encompass
conduct wholly unconnected to organized crime. RICO's criminal
prohibitions may be viewed as applying to anyone who commits a listed
predicate offense on two or more occasions while participating in the
operation of a legitimate business, union, or other associated group of
individuals. 76
Persons convicted of engaging in this prohibited conduct are subject to
traditional criminal sanctions such as enhanced fines and terms of
imprisonment, and also to the then-novel remedy of criminal forfeiture.
77
The version approved by the Senate also authorized civil injunctive relief
on behalf of the government, consciously modeled on the federal antitrust
laws.78 There was, however, no provision for private civil actions until late
71. See Organized Crime Control Act § 901(a), 84 Stat. at 942-43 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2006)). A fourth prohibition, § 1962(d), criminalizes conspiracies to violate the
first three prohibitions.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See also Lynch, supra note 64, at 681-83. Put differently, the
enterprise is a victim in the first two forms of racketeering activity (§ 1962(a) and (b)), while the
enterprise is in effect the perpetrator under § 1962(c), as its affairs are conducted through a pattern of
racketeering activity. I am grateful to my colleague, Alan Michaels, for this insight.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
74. Id. § 1961(1)(A) (listing nine state law offenses); id. § 1961(1)(B) (listing inter alia §§ 1341,
1951, 1956, relating to mail fraud, extortion, and money laundering, respectively).
75. Id. § 1961(5).
76. See Lynch, supra note 64, at 685-94.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1963; S. REP. No. 91-617, at 79 (1969) ("The use of criminal
forfeiture... represents an innovative attempt to call on our common law heritage to meet an
essentially modem problem."); ABA Report, supra note 64, at 95.
78. See ABA Report, supra note 64, at 96-97 (excerpting and discussing S. REP. NO. 91-617, at
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in the legislative process, when the House took up the Senate-approved
version of the bill.
2. Addition of a Private Civil Remedy
For a provision that has given rise to so much litigation and
controversy, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (authorizing private damages actions) 79
has a remarkably thin legislative history. The provision was first put
forward at a House subcommittee hearing by Representative Sam Steiger
and also by the American Bar Association ("ABA"). 8' Both Representative
Steiger and the ABA patterned their request on the treble damages
provision in Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act.8 ' Steiger explained that
"those who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given
access to a legal remedy" and that "the availability of such a remedy would
enhance the effectiveness of [T]itle IX's prohibitions."82 The House
Judiciary Committee incorporated the provision as one of some fifty
amendments prior to reporting favorably on the bill as a whole.8 3 When the
amended bill was taken up in the House, the ranking minority member of
the Judiciary Committee summarized important changes made from the
Senate-passed version without mentioning the addition of the private cause
of action.84 The following day, a second prominent committee supporter
briefly noted the addition as part of his statement on the floor,
characterizing it as "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted
for use against organized criminality."
85
Although the private damages provision seemed a minor change to the
80-83). The Senate report relied expressly on the ABA committee's observation that "[t]he time tested
machinery of the antitrust laws contains several useful and workable features which are appropriate for
use against organized crime." S. REP. No. 91-617, at 81 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 6995 (1969)).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (authorizing federal district court actions to recover treble damages and
attorney's fees for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962").
80. See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals, Before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 520, 547-48 (1970) (statements of Rep. Steiger and
the ABA).
81. See id. at 520 (referencing antitrust laws); id. at 548 (citing Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1968)).
82. Id. at 520. Similarly, Senator McClellan, commenting briefly on the ABA proposal months
before it was added to the House bill, described it as potentially "a major new tool in extirpating the
baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life." 116 CONG. REC. 25,190 (1970).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 57-58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034;
116 CONG. REc. at 35,197 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (referring to fifty changes in the House
substitute).
84. See 116 CONG. REc. at 35,197-98 (remarks ofRep. McCulloch).
85. Id. at 35,295 (remarks of Rep. Poff).
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bill's key supporters, it attracted the attention of several bill opponents. In
their dissenting views to the House Judiciary Committee report,
Representatives John Conyers, Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan
criticized the new provision for inviting "disgruntled and malicious
competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged in interstate
commerce." 86 The dissenters went on to predict that "[w]hat a protracted,
expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well
accomplish-destruction of the rival's business." 87 Representative Mikva
then offered an unsuccessful floor amendment seeking to authorize treble
damages actions against anyone who brought a frivolous lawsuit under the
new section. 8 The House passed its version of the Organized Crime
Control Act by an overwhelming margin in the final days of the 91st
Congress, and the Senate concurred in the House version with no comment
or discussion on the RICO civil damages provision.89
This sparse legislative history arguably points in two different
directions. One could infer from the House committee report dissenting
views, followed by the failed Mikva floor amendment, that House members
were sufficiently apprised of the risks associated with authorizing private
damages actions and that they voted to do so with eyes open. Fifteen years
later, Mikva himself ruefully recognized the unintended impact of his
"parade of horribles" approach, testifying to former colleagues that "[m]y
hyperbole has been used by lawyers to prove that is what Congress had in
mind" when it voted for the House version of the bill.9"
On the other hand, Mikva's negative comments on civil damages
actions are contained in one paragraph of a fifteen-page dissent that itself is
part of a two-hundred-page committee report filed less than a week before
the massive Organized Crime Control Act was taken up by the full
House.9 And Mikva's floor amendment was voted on by sixty-seven
members meeting as the Committee of the Whole, less than one-sixth of the
body.92 More generally, deriving the intent of the House from the dire
86. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 187 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyvers, Mikva, and Ryan).
87. Id.
88. See 116 CONG. REC. at 35,342-43. The amendment was defeated in the Committee of the
Whole by a vote of 45-22. See id. at 35,343.
89. See id. at 35,363 (reporting a House vote of 341-26 on final passage); id. at 36,296 (reporting
unanimous acceptance by the Senate of the House-passed version).
90. RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, and
HR. 5445 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 527
(1985-86) [hereinafter 1985-86 House Hearings] (statement of Mikva, J.).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 181-96 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and
Ryan).
92. See 116 CONG. REC. at 35,342-43.
[Vol. 83:731
HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 748 2009-2010
2010] CLAIMS OF RICO EXTORTION AGAINST UNION CAMPAIGNS 749
predictions offered by three opponents to a bill supported on final passage
by over 90 percent of voting members seems highly questionable, quite
apart from there having been no discussion at all of the provision by the
Senate.
A more likely lesson to be drawn from this legislative history would
invoke Sherlock Holmes's insight about the dog that did not bark.93 If
Congress had meant to create a substantial freestanding civil action for use
in ordinary commercial disputes, key supporters would have expressed this
intent rather than simply describing the new provision as an added tool in
the fight against organized crime. The belated insertion of a private
damages provision, combined with minimal explanation or commentary
from supporters, suggests it was viewed at the time as of little consequence.
Still, that Congress likely never anticipated the breadth of RICO's private
damages provision does not mean the language itself is limited to organized
crime settings. The Supreme Court in its initial wave of RICO decisions
made clear that breadth of coverage is precisely what the RICO text
provides.
C. AN EXPANSIVE FIRST GENERATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Criminal prosecutions under RICO were infrequent during the Act's
early years and civil lawsuits were almost nonexistent.94 The Supreme
Court did not hear its first RICO case until 198195 and did not issue a
decision involving a civil RICO action until 1985.96 Once it entered the
field, however, the Court firmly established RICO's broad scope with
respect to civil damages actions. A trio of decisions 97 made clear that civil
RICO covers a range of activities wholly unrelated to the "infiltration of
legitimate businesses" rationale that dominates the legislative history.98
Following two cases that expanded the reach of criminal prosecutions
under RICO,99 the Court turned its attention to private civil actions in
93. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 & n.23 (1991) (referring to ARTHUR CONAN
DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 346-47 (Doubleday 1930)); Harrison
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-975, at 6-7 (1990) (reporting data on criminal and civil RICO filings
as part of a report accompanying the proposed RICO Amendments Act of 1990); Lynch, supra note 64,
at 695 (discussing a three-year hiatus before the first reported court opinion dealing with RICO).
95. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
96. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
97. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J. Inc. v. Nw.
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, 473 U.S. 479.
98. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590.
99. See id. at 580-93 (broadly construing the term "enterprise" to encompass illegitimate as well
HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 749 2009-2010
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 100 The case involved a joint business venture
in which one company-convinced it was being overbilled for expenses
and thereby cheated out of profits by the other-asserted RICO claims
under § 1964(c) for alleged violations of § 1962(c), based on predicate acts
of mail and wire fraud.' 0' These RICO claims were dismissed by the
district court and the Second Circuit affirmed on two separate grounds. The
court of appeals reasoned that under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must allege a
"racketeering injury," meaning the type of organized crime injury that
RICO was designed to deter rather than simply an injury occurring as a
result of the predicate acts themselves. 10 2 The appellate court also
concluded that a valid RICO complaint must allege that respondents had
been convicted of the RICO predicate acts, not simply that respondents had
committed those acts. 103
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision. 10 4 Writing for the
majority, Justice White took note of the legislative history linking the treble
damages provision to the goal of extirpating organized crime. But based on
the Act's definition of "racketeering activities"-encompassing conduct
that is no more than "chargeable," "punishable," or "indictable" under a
range of specified federal and state laws-the majority held that a prior
conviction was not required. 10 5 The majority also rejected the appellate
court's second prerequisite for a private action under RICO, that the injury
be "caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."'0 6 Justice
White observed that racketeering activities as defined involve nothing other
than the commission of a predicate act, and that § 1962 prohibits "'any
person'-not just mobsters" from acquiring an interest in or participating in
the conduct of an enterprise through such racketeering activities.10 7
The majority conceded that it was interpreting the civil RICO
as legitimate enterprises, and holding that the Act's criminal prohibitions apply to participation in an
entity or association that performs only unlawful activities and has not infiltrated or attempted to
infiltrate a legitimate enterprise); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20-29 (1983) (broadly
construing the criminal penalty provision on forfeiture to hold that insurance proceeds received as a
result of racketeering activities constitute an "interest" subject to forfeiture).
100. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479.
101. Id. at 483-84.
102. Id. at 484-85.
103. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496-503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479.
104. See Sedima, 473 U.S. 479. Justice White authored the majority opinion; Justices Marshall
and Powell each wrote lengthy and impassioned dissents. See id. at 500-23, 523-30.
105. See id. at 488-89.
106. Id. at 493-94 (quoting Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494).
107. Id. at 495 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984)).
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provisions very broadly, but it emphasized that Congress meant for RICO
to be construed broadly-as evidenced in its "self-consciously expansive
language"'08 and also the express textual statement that RICO is to "be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."'10 9 At the same
time, the Court understood that private civil actions were being brought
almost solely against legitimate businesses rather than against mobsters or
organized criminals, and accordingly that "in its private civil version,
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original
conception of its enactors."11 The Court's response, however, was that it
was bound by the clear breadth of the text itself, and any corrections must
come from Congress.' 1
Sedima established the Supreme Court's doctrinal and institutional
approach for a first generation of decisions applying RICO's private civil
provisions. The Justices could have confined civil RICO to conduct
adjudicated as criminal or directly linked to organized crime. The Court
could have done so based on the Act's legislative history and also on larger
policy considerations the Court has often deemed important, such as the
rule of lenity, the need to avoid federalizing large areas of state law, and
the desirability of not supplanting other well-established federal regulatory
schemes. 1" 2 Instead, the Court relied on a contested "plain meaning"
analysis of text to conclude that its hands were effectively tied. 1 3 And
while acknowledging the unanticipated breadth of its interpretation from
Congress's perspective, the Court in Sedima declined to signal any limits to
this broad coverage; it simply invited Congress to address the situation.
The Court pursued its expansive text-based approach in two other
108. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981)).
109. Id. (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970)).
110. Id. at 500.
111. See id. at 499.
112. See id. at 501, 504-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 526-29 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the statutory language and legislative history are consistent with a narrow
reading of the statute). For indications that the Justices were attentive to these policy considerations,
see, for example, Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (2000); Ratzlafv. United States, 510
U.S. 135, 148-49 (1994), superseded by statute, Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253; and McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181, 7603.
113. Justice Marshall, writing for four Justices in dissent, invoked the plain meaning of § 1964(c),
which grants a private cause of action only to persons injured "by reason of a violation of § 1962"; he
argued that the majority had ignored this plain meaning by in effect authorizing recovery whenever
there has been a violation of § 1962. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 508-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984)).
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early cases construing RICO's private damages provisions. In H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., telephone company customers sought
treble damages under RICO, alleging that the company had made cash and
in-kind payments to public utility commissioners in a fraudulent scheme to
secure rates in excess of a fair and reasonable amount. 1 4 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, and in doing so
rejected the Eighth Circuit's test requiring that a pattern of racketeering
activity involve multiple illegal schemes.
115
Writing for five members, Justice Brennan began by noting that in the
four years since Sedima, "Congress has done nothing... further to
illuminate RICO's key requirement of a pattern of racketeering."] 116 The
majority found no textual support for the Eighth Circuit's multiple-scheme
rule or for the parallel arguments (advanced by numerous amici) that a
defendant's racketeering activities form a pattern only if they are
"characteristic either of organized crime ... or of an organized-crime-type
perpetrator."" 7 The Court instead held that Congress envisioned a "flexible
concept of a pattern," 18 one that could be established by a single scheme of
two or more racketeering predicates so long as the predicates are shown to
be related and to pose a threat of continued criminal activity." 9 The Court
recognized the open-ended nature of this standard, but invoked its earlier
reliance on "RICO's 'self-consciously expansive language and overall
approach"' to resist any narrower construction.'20
Five years later, in National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler (Scheidler 1), the Court considered a RICO civil action alleging
that a coalition of antiabortion groups were conspiring to shut down
abortion clinics through extortion and related racketeering activities. 121 The
Supreme Court again reversed a lower court dismissal, this time rejecting
the Seventh Circuit's test that racketeering predicate acts or a racketeering
enterprise must be accompanied by an underlying economic motive. 122
Writing for a unanimous majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
that the Act sets forth broad definitions of both "racketeering activity" and
"enterprise," but those definitions nowhere refer to the requirement or even
114. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1989).
115. Id. at 234-35.
116. Id. at 236.
117. ld. at243.
118. Id. at 239.
119. See id. at 239-42.
120. Id. at 249 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985)).
121. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994).
122. Id. at 254, 256-60.
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possibility of an economic motive. 123 Rehnquist viewed the RICO text that
comes closest to suggesting the need for an economic motive as § 1962(c),
prohibiting use of racketeering activities to participate in the conduct of
"any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
commerce."1 24 The majority relied on a dictionary definition of "affect" to
construe this text, concluding that an enterprise "surely can have a
detrimental influence on interstate or foreign commerce without having its
own profit-seeking motives."' 125
The Court went on to reject the respondent's reliance on RICO's
statement of findings which had emphasized that organized crime was
draining billions of dollars from the American economy. 126 In doing so, the
Court reiterated its now-familiar position that while RICO as enacted "had
organized crime as its focus, [it] was not limited in application to organized
crime." 127 Finally, the Court declined to consult either legislative history or
the rule of lenity because the text itself was unambiguous; the Court added
the mantra from Sedima that RICO's "appli[cation] in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth."'
128
Although no Justice voted against the result in Northwestern Bell or
Scheidler I, there were serious concerns expressed in each case. In
Northwestern Bell, Justice Scalia and three other Justices concurred only in
the Court's judgment. 129 Scalia found the Court's definition of "pattern"
vague and unhelpful, and he expressed a broader discomfort that the
Court's decision in Sedima was effectively allowing civil RICO actions to
transform private litigation and to federalize whole areas of state common
law. 130 And in Scheidler I, Justices Souter and Kennedy wrote separately to
emphasize that despite the Court's extension of RICO's scope to
123. Id. at 256-57.
124. Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994)).
125. Id. at 258.
126. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84. Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970).
127. Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 260 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248
(1989)).
128. Id. at 262 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). See also Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1985) (per curiam) (relying on
Sedima to reject summarily the argument that a civil RICO injury must flow from a defendant's
performance of predicate acts as part of the conduct of an enterprise, and holding that injury from the
predicate offenses alone was sufficient).
129. See Nw. Bell, 492 U.S. at 251-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.).
130. Id. at 255 (citing with approval Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Sedima, 473 U.S. at
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noneconomically based entities such as civil rights organizations, the First
Amendment might preclude the statute's application in certain instances.1 31
Souter specifically referenced conduct alleged to constitute Hobbs Act
extortion or one of the other comparably open-ended predicate acts that
might "be fully protected First Amendment activity, entitling the defendant
to dismissal on that basis."
' 132
Notwithstanding such concerns, the first generation of Court
decisions, led by Sedima, contributed to a substantial increase in private
RICO litigation. From enactment in 1970 through 1985, there were a total
of 270 civil RICO cases reported. 133 Between 1985 and 1990, roughly 1000
civil cases were filed each year. 134 The number of RICO filings in federal
district courts has declined somewhat since the early 1990s, but the average
annual number from 2001 to 2008 remains above 700.135 Included in this
torrent of civil RICO cases are a considerable number of RICO claims from
employers alleging extortionate conduct by unions in the midst of labor
management disputes.
D. PRIVATE RICO ACTIONS AGAINST LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Since the late 1980s, employer litigation against unions often has
included claims under RICO. Over the past two-plus decades, dozens of
district court decisions have addressed these issues,136 and there are
131. See Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 263-65 (Souter, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 264 (citing NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982)).
133. H.R. REP. No. 101-975, at 7 (1990) (citing Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Dir., Admin.
Office of U.S. Courts, to William J. Hughes, Chair, House Subcomm. on Crime (June 9, 1989)
[hereinafter U.S. Courts Letter]).
134. See id. (citing U.S. Courts Letter) (reporting that an average of 1000 civil cases were filed
each year from 1986 through 1989); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD
STATISTICS: DECEMBER 31, 1990, at 33 (1990) (reporting that 957 private civil RICO actions were
commenced during the twelve-month period ending December 31, 1990).
135. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31,
2008, at 45 (2008) (637 private civil RICO actions); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2007, at 45 (2007) (701 private civil RICO actions);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2006, at 44
(2006) (676 private civil RICO actions); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2005, at 44 (2005) (832 private civil RICO actions); ADMIN.
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2004, at 44 (2004)
(691 private civil RICO actions); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2003, at 44 (2003) (835 private civil RICO actions); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2002, at 46 (2002) (700 private civil
RICO actions); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH
31,2001, at 46 (2001) (787 private civil RICO actions).
136. In addition to the district court cases cited infra at notes 138-39, 141-43, and 148, see cases
cited or discussed in 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2500-2654 (John E. Higgins, Jr., et al. eds., 5th
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doubtless many more filed actions that were settled or disposed of without
a district court ruling on the employer's RICO claim. A handful of federal
appellate court opinions also have examined issues of union civil liability
under RICO. 
137
In some of these actions, employers challenged as racketeering
activity union conduct that was not part of a comprehensive campaign.
1 38
With respect to RICO claims that involve extended union campaigns,
employers may allege that union conduct includes regular or pervasive acts
of violence. 139 It is also the case that unions or employees bring RICO
claims against employers with some frequency.
140
Nonetheless, there are a substantial number of RICO actions brought
by employers, implicating union comprehensive campaigns in the
organizing or bargaining context, where employers allege that various
nonviolent campaign tactics and activities amount to extortionate conduct.
Employers began bringing these cases in the late 1980s, 141 they did so
during the 1990s, 142 and allegations that union campaign activities should
ed. 2006).
137. See, e.g., Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374-76 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel
Employees Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res. LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2004); Petrochem
Insulation Inc. v. NLRB, 240 F.3d 26, 28-33 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Monterey Plaza Hotel Ltd. P'ship v.
Local 483, Hotel Employees Union, 215 F.3d 923, 925-28 (9th Cir. 2000).
138. See, e.g., Asbestos & Lead Removal Corp. v. Severino, No. CV-06-5949 (BMC) (MDG),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24134, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007); Levin-Richmond Terminal Corp. v.
Int'l Longshoremen's Union, Local 10, 751 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1990); MHC, Inc. v. Int'l
Union, United Mine Workers, 685 F. Supp. 1370, 1373-74 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
139. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. United Steel Workers, No. C-1-00-374, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19676, at *6-8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2002); Ovemite Transp. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 826, 833-35 (W.D. Tenn. 2001); Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp.
753, 761-62 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
140. See, e.g., Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004) (employees' suit
against employers); Butchers' Union, Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., 631 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (E.D. Cal.
1986) (union claim against employer); Susan J. McGolrick, Attorney Says Latest Trend in RICO Suits Is
Suing Employers That Hire Illegal Workers, [2005] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-I (Aug. 12, 2005);
Court Dismisses Union Steward's RICO Lawsuit Against Employer, [1995] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at
A- 1 (Oct. 18, 1995); Rubber Workers Settle RICO Suit over Closing of Uniroyal Plant, [1992] Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-5 (July 14, 1992).
141. See, e.g., Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. N. Cal. & N. Nev. Pipe Trades Council, No. C-90-
3628 EFL, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6659, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1991) (indicating the complaint
alleged that the union extortion activities began in 1988), afd, 8 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
opinion); Tex. Air Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, No. 88-0804, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11149
(S.D. Fla. July 14, 1989).
142. See, e.g., Mariah Boat, Inc. v. Laborers Int'l Union, 19 F. Supp. 2d 893 (S.D. Ill. 1998); A.
Terzi Prods. v. Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F. Supp. 2d 485, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Bayou Steel Corp.
v. United Steel Workers, No. Civ. A. 95-496-RRM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22938 (D. Del. Jan. 11,
1996).
HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 755 2009-2010
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:731
be deemed extortionate continued to be raised in the 2000s. 143 The reported
decisions in these cases tend to involve a union's motion to dismiss RICO
claims on various grounds; such motions succeed or fail at roughly
comparable levels. 144
Management attorneys have expressed reservations when discussing
the efficacy of RICO and other civil actions solely as legal approaches to
defeat comprehensive campaigns. 45 When assessing the value of RICO
lawsuits in strategic terms, however, employer advocates are more bullish.
As one attorney representing management recently explained to The New
York Times, lawsuits that survive motions to dismiss usually trigger
settlement discussions, and "[w]hen [unions] settle, ... it normally breaks
the campaign."' 146 There is ample evidence that RICO actions can have a
chilling effect on unions and their individual supporters. 147 Of course, there
is nothing wrong with employers relying on reasonable or even plausibly
contestable legal arguments to survive motions to dismiss a RICO claim.
But if a core legal argument is determined to be unreasonable or
implausible as a matter of law, its settlement value would disappear and its
adverse reputational impact would presumably decline as well.
143. See, e.g., Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 355 F. App'x
508 (2d Cir. 2009); Wackenhut Corp. v. SEIU, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Smithfield
Foods, Inc. v. Commercial Workers Int'l, 593 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Va. 2008); Transcript of Motion
Hearing, Food Lion, Inc. v. Commercial Workers Int'l (D. S.C. 2003) (No. 2:96-CV-0687).
144. See Cintas, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571 (granting dismissal); Wackenhut, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289
(granting dismissal); Smithfield Foods, 593 F. Supp. 2d 840 (denying dismissal); Mariah Boat, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 893 (granting dismissal); A. Terzi Prods., 2 F. Supp. 2d 485 (denying dismissal); Bayou Steel,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22938 (denying dismissal); Petrochem, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6659 (granting
dismissal).
145. See Baskin & Northrup, supra note 7, at 217 (discussing inter alia RICO actions and opining
that such actions "have had only limited success in the courts"); Stanley J. Brown & Alyse Bass,
Corporate Campaigns: Employer Responses to Labor's New Weapons, 6 LAB. LAW. 975, 978 (1990)
(reviewing employer legal strategies including RICO actions and observing that "[in short, employer
efforts to utilize the Board and the courts for relief will often be frustrated, particularly if a union is well
advised by counsel").
146. Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting G. Robert Blakey, one of the lawyers in Smithfield Foods).
Blakey, who helped draft RICO in 1970 as an aide to Senator McClellan, has appeared as counsel to
employers in other RICO actions. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850 (7th Cir.
1998); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss,
Cintas, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571 (No. 08-CV-2185).
147. See, e.g., JURAVICH & BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 50, at 87 (describing the chilling effect
on a local union and its leaders during the campaign against Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation);
RICO Is a "Powerful Tool" in Labor Disputes, CIVIL RICO REPORT (LRP Publications), Sept. 17, 2002
(quoting a union attorney at an ABA annual meeting, observing that management sees civil RICO as a
means to weaken or destroy unions, adding that "Itjoday, RICO is the most powerful tool management
has against organized labor"); Rick Boucher, Editorial, Raising the Bogy of Big Business, WASH. POST,
May 13, 1989, at A17 (criticizing the chilling effect of a three-billon dollar RICO suit filed by Frank
Lorenzo against Eastern Airlines pilots and mechanics unions).
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When unions move to dismiss employers' RICO claims, they may do
so on numerous grounds other than whether the challenged campaign
amounts to extortion. Unions often argue that an employer's claim is
preempted under federal labor law. 148 They also may contend that the union
and its supporters do not qualify as a RICO enterprise, 149 that the union's
conduct does not constitute a "pattern" of activity, 5 ' or that the union has
not committed a predicate offense (other than extortion) alleged in the
complaint. 1 '
The central element in employers' RICO challenges to comprehensive
campaigns is, however, the allegation of extortion. The whole point of
these campaigns is to impose extended economic pressure on companies, to
instill a sufficient fear of economic loss so as to squeeze the employer and
extract procedural or substantive concessions in the areas of union
recognition or collective bargaining. Whether this approach essentially
qualifies as permissible concerted activity or as "the same thing as what
John Gotti used to do"'152 raises basic issues of statutory meaning, issues
that turn on doctrine rather than on factual complexity.153 Although the
federal crime of extortion is defined under the Hobbs Act, the interpretation
of that definition in private civil litigation against unions has become
148. See, e.g., Merryman Excavation, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 552 F.
Supp. 2d 745, 749-52 (N.D. Il1. 2008) (granting dismissal on grounds of LMRA Section 301
preemption); Mariah Boat, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 897-900 (denying dismissal on grounds of NLRA
preemption); Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(same); Buck Creek Coal Inc. v. United Mine Workers, 917 F. Supp. 601, 610-11 (S.D. Ind. 1995)
(granting dismissal on grounds of NLRA preemption); Petrochem, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6659, at
* 15-20 (same).
149. See, e.g., New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers, 18 F.3d 1161,
1163 (4th Cir. 1994) (granting dismissal because "persons" were not distinct from the "enterprise");
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 139-41, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(affirming the inadequacy of the original complaint naming the union as both person and enterprise),
ajffd in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Northrup & Steen, supra note 4, at
775-76 (discussing the issue of distinct identities involving a RICO person and enterprise).
150. See, e.g., Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1397-98 (11th Cir. 1994)
(denying the union's motion for summary judgment), amended by 30 F.3d 1347 (1Ith Cir. 1994); A.
Terzi Prods. v. Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F. Supp. 2d 485, 508-09 (S.D.NY. 1998) (denying the
union's motion to dismiss).
151. See, e.g., Monterey Plaza Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Local 483, Hotel Employees Union, 215 F.3d
923, 926-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal because the complaint failed to state a claim for mail
fraud or wire fraud); Teamsters Local 372, 956 F. Supp. at 764-65 (denying dismissal where the
complaint adequately stated a claim alleging attempted robbery and arson).
152. See Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting G. Robert Blakey).
153. By contrast, the issue of federal labor law preemption often implicates difficult mixed
matters of fact and law, such as whether the labor law questions in the case are merely "collateral" and
whether a violation of the RICO predicate offense may be found only if the union's conduct violates the
NLRA. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 370 F.3d 602, 608-11 (6th Cir. 2004).
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distinctly a matter of RICO's doctrinal application.
Before addressing this doctrinal matter, we first consider the record of
RICO reform efforts by Congress, and the Supreme Court's later cases
interpreting civil RICO. The Court's second generation of decisions,
especially two cases decided in 2003 and 2007, suggest that the meaning of
extortion ought not to cover the activities typically engaged in during union
campaigns.
III. REFORMING RICO: CONGRESSIONAL INACTION AND
SUPREME COURT INITIATIVES
A. FAILED EFFORTS AT LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Congress began exploring measures to limit the scope of private civil
RICO in 1985 and 1986, as Sedima was being argued and decided by the
Supreme Court. The criticisms raised to justify reform were strikingly
similar to those voiced by Justices Marshall and Powell in their Sedima
dissents. 154 Business representatives and some government regulators
explained that § 1964(c) had become a weapon in ordinary commercial
disputes wholly unrelated to organized crimes; that civil RICO was
supplanting established federal regulatory schemes that did not provide for
treble damages or attorney's fees in their private rights of action; and that
the civil cause of action was burdening the federal court system by
federalizing vast areas of state law. 155
Substantial support to reform civil RICO came initially from all three
branches. The Department of Justice testified largely in favor of pending
House and Senate bills in 1989.156 The Court majority in Sedima had
154. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 470, 500-30 (1985) (Marshall and Powell, JJ.,
dissenting).
155. See 1985-86 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 487 (statement of Sam Scott Miller, Vice
President and General Counsel, Paine Webber Group) (discussing RICO abuse in ordinary business
disputes); id. at 779-80 (statement of Roger E. Middleton, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (same); id. at 192 (statement of Irvin B. Nathan, on behalf of the Alliance of American
Insurers) (discussing federalization of state common law remedies); id. at 792-94 (statement of John M.
Finch, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers) (discussing vast growth of federal RICO
litigation); Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
632-33 (1985) (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, President, Securities Industry Association) (discussing
supplanting of securities laws); ABA Report, supra note 64, app. F, at 3-5 (memorandum of SEC
Commissioner Charles L. Marinaccio) (same). See also Bruce Haber, Note, Congress Responds to
Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 851, 867-82 (1986) (describing
the abuse of RICO and examining counterarguments).
156. See S. REP. No. 101-269, at 4 (1990); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Reform Act: Hearing on S. 438 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 50-51 (1989)
[Vol. 83:731
HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 758 2009-2010
2010] CLAIMS OF RICO EXTORTIONAGAINST UNION CAMPAIGNS 759
implicitly invited Congress to override its decision, 157 and Chief Justice
Rehnquist made that invitation unusually explicit. In a 1989 speech titled
Reforming RICO, Rehnquist noted an eightfold increase in RICO civil
filings between 1983 and 1988, emphasized that the provision "is now
being used in ways that Congress never intended,"' 58 and concluded "the
time has arrived for Congress to enact amendments to civil RICO to limit
its scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or
have some other reason for being in federal court." 159 During this same
period, then-U.S. Attorney Samuel Alito coedited a book titled The RICO
Racket, in which he acknowledged the loud calls for amending civil RICO
while expressing the hope that federal criminal enforcement would not be
adversely affected. 6 0
Congress seriously pursued comprehensive civil RICO reform
between 1985 and 1992 and considered an additional reform possibility in
1998.161 Bills favored by the judiciary committees in one or both chambers
during this period featured numerous significant proposed changes,
including: (1) barring private civil actions unless the defendant had been
previously convicted of a RICO predicate offense; (2) barring treble
damages and attorney's fees except for instances in which a prior RICO
offense conviction was present; (3) inserting a more precise and restrictive
definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"; (4) imposing tougher
federal pleading rules for all civil RICO cases; (5) creating an affirmative
defense for persons who relied in good faith on state or federal regulatory
action when performing the challenged activities; (6) prohibiting use of the
term "racketeering activity" in civil suits not alleging a crime of violence;
and (7) prohibiting RICO lawsuits that challenge nonviolent public speech
expressed through protests, rallies, or demonstrations. 162 One reform
[hereinafter 1989 Senate Hearing] (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice); RICO Reform Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1046
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 91 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 House Hearings] (same).
157. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
158. William H. Rehnquist, Reforming RICO, in THE RICO RACKET 63, 64 (Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
et al. eds., 1989).
159. Id. at 67.
160. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Racketeering Made Simple(r), in THE RICO RACKET, supra note
158, at 13-14.
161. See sources cited infra notes 162-65 (indicating major reform proposals between 1985 and
1992); Civil RICO Clarification Act of 1998, H.R. 4245, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998) (proposing to remove
extortion as a separate predicate act for civil RICO actions).
162. See, e.g., RICO Amendments Act of 1991, H.R. 1717, 102d Cong. § 3 (1991) (adding stricter
pleading requirements and a higher burden of proof and requiring that the defendant be a "major
participant" in criminal conduct responsible for the plaintiffs injury); RICO Reform Act of 1989, S.
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measure was approved by the House but died on the Senate floor in
October 1986.163 Bills in subsequent Congresses received approval from
the House or Senate Judiciary Committees, but did not garner support in
either chamber as a whole."6 By late 1991, momentum had receded for the
reform of civil RICO. 165
Although organized labor was a marginal player in these legislative
efforts, it regularly supported major civil RICO reform proposals during the
1985-1992 period.166 Through testimony at congressional hearings and
letters submitted to Congress, the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") and individual unions
expressed their concerns about application of civil RICO to "run of the
mine.., labor disputes" bearing no relation to organized crime. 1 67 And the
438, 101st Cong. § 4 (1989) (prohibiting treble damages and attorney's fees unless there has been a
prior RICO conviction and prohibiting private actions against nonviolent public speech); H.R. 2943,
99th Cong. (1985) (permitting private actions only with a prior conviction for a RICO offense). See also
H.R. 4245 (eliminating the RICO predicate offense of extortion).
163. 132 CONG. REc. 32,497-504 (1986) (reporting on the civil RICO amendment proposed by
Senators Howard Metzenbaum and Dale Bumpers, identical to the bill that passed 371-28 in the House,
which was tabled 47-44 following debate).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 102-312, at 7-8 (1991) (discussing H.R. 1717, favorably reported on
November 13, 1991); H.R. REP. No. 101-975, at 5-9 (1990) (discussing H.R. 5111, favorably reported
on October 27, 1990); S. REP. No. 101-269, at 4 (1990) (discussing S. 1523, favorably reported by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on May 24, 1988 although no floor action was taken); id. at 5-10
(discussing S. 438, favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 1, 1990).
165. Melanie Oberlin, reference librarian at the Moritz College of Law, conducted searches on
December 2-3, 2009, on Thomas (http://thomas.loc.gov) and in the CCH Congressional Index for bills
in the 102nd Congress (1991-1992) aimed at amending civil RICO. The search identified no bill in the
Senate, and only H.R. 1717 in the House. A further search of congressional hearings, using the CIS
Index on LexisNexis Congressional, indicates there were major hearings on civil RICO reform from
early 1985 through April 1991, and then no more hearings until 1998.
166. Additionally, minor bills introduced during this period would have eliminated civil RICO
actions for conduct "in connection with and during a labor dispute." RICO Act of 1987, H.R. 3240,
100th Cong. § 4(b) (1987); Crime Control Act of 1988, H.R. 4920, 100th Cong. § 4 (1988). See also S.
300, 99th Cong. (1985) (creating an affirmative defense under the Hobbs Act for conduct "incidental to
peaceful picketing in the course of a legitimate labor dispute"). None of these bills reached the
committee report stage.
167. 1985-86 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 1451 (Letter from Laurence Gold, AFL-CIO
General Counsel to House Judiciary Committee Chairman Conyers); id. at 1451-57. See also id. at
1459-60 (Letter from William B. Welch, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Director of Legislation); id. at 1556-57 (Letter from William W. Winpisinger, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers President); id. at 1619-22 (Letter from Arnold
Mayer, United Food and Commercial Workers Director of Govemment Affairs); RICO Amendments
Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 1717 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 135 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 House
Hearing] (statement of Ernest Dubester, Legislative Rep., AFL-CIO); 1989 House Hearings, supra note
156, at 247 (same); 1989 Senate Hearing, supra note 156, at 169 (same); Proposed RICO Reform
Legislation: Hearings on S. 1523 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 292 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings] (same).
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Senate Judiciary Committee specifically noted that the use of civil RICO
against unions in labor disputes "is not what Congress had in mind when it
was debating RICO" in 1970.168
Several labor-specific factors add weight to the contention that
Congress in 1970 never meant to cover ordinary labor-management
controversies. One involves the jurisdiction of congressional committees. If
the Senate or House had intended that RICO might be used against strikes,
demonstrations, or similar economically motivated group action by unions,
the bill would have been referred to Congress's respective labor
committees in addition to the judiciary committees. As G. Robert Blakey,
chief aide to Senator McClellan, pointed out, it was no accident that such a
referral never took place-Senator McClellan's instructions were to be sure
that RICO's civil sanctions would not "be used at all in the context of
demonstrations of any type."'169 A second factor involves the predicate
offenses contained in the definition of racketeering activity set forth in
§ 1961 (1). Included in the list of over seventy separately indictable federal
offenses are two crimes specified under federal labor law: embezzlement
from union funds and improper payments or loans to labor organizations. 1
70
This attention to crimes implicating financial corruption in labor-
management relations arguably indicates the nature of labor-related RICO
coverage that Congress had in mind. Finally, and on a related note,
repeated statements from key RICO sponsors focused on union abuses that
were far removed from ordinary labor-management disputes. The union-
related evils of particular concern to Senators McClellan and Hruska and
Representative Poff included use of violence, extortion, and manipulation
to "sell" labor peace to employers or contractors, to impose sweetheart
labor contracts that depress employee wages and funnel extra monies to
crime bosses, or to eject union members who try to resist mob control. 17 1
168. S. REP. No. 101-269, at 2.
169. Application of the RICO Law to Nonviolent Advocacy Groups: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 24-25 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 House
Hearing] (statement of G. Robert Blakey). See also 1991 House Hearing, supra note 167, at 135
(discussing Blakey's comments characterizing the Daily News strike as a classic misuse of civil RICO).
Blakey's comments at the 1998 hearing and his paraphrased remarks from the 1991 hearing were made
more than two decades after the original legislative record for RICO. Post-enactment history is
generally viewed as unreliable, but Blakey's role in drafting RICO is widely recognized and continues
to be credited.
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(C) (2006) (specifically including acts indictable under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 186 and 501(c) (2006)).
171. See 116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 595-97 (remarks of Sen.
McClellan, reprinting The Conglomerate of Crime, TIME, Aug. 22, 1969, at 31); id. at 601 (remarks of
Sen. Hruska); id. at 35,201 (remarks of Rep. Poff). See also id. at 820 (remarks of Sen. Scott)
(referencing misuses of union pension funds); id. at 35,319 (remarks ofRep. Roth) (same).
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In the end, Congress failed to enact reforms narrowing the overall
scope of civil RICO for a number of reasons. The Justice Department
objected to some proposed versions on the grounds that they would weaken
its ability to pursue misconduct under the Act. 172 Key state government
representatives such as the National Association of Attorneys General and
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners expressed concern
over limiting states' ability to pursue civil actions.173  Consumer
organizations, trial lawyers, and women's groups also resisted what they
viewed as efforts to undermine civil enforcement. 174 In addition, the
volume of federal court cases declined somewhat in the early 1990s. 175 The
decline continued after 1995, when Congress enacted its only substantive
narrowing of civil RICO by barring civil actions for securities fraud absent
a prior criminal conviction.'1 76
Yet while Congress was unable to enact the major revisions proposed
between 1985 and 1998, advocates for reform have achieved some success
through the venue of the Supreme Court. Two sets of specific proposals
warrant attention in this regard. First, reform advocates objected to the
breadth of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful to "conduct or
172. See, e.g., 1991 House Hearing, supra note 167, at 12-13, 25-33 (statement of John C.
Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice); H.R. REP. No.
102-312, at 25-27 (1991) (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Edwards, Schroeder, Levine,
Washington, and Reed, noting concerns of the Department of Justice).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 102-312, at 25 (discussing opposition from the National Association of
Attorneys General and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners); 1989 Senate Hearing,
supra note 156, at 90-104 (statement of Steven J. Twist, Chief Assistant Att'y Gen., National
Association of Attorneys General); id. at, 660-73 (statement of James Long, Comm'r of Insurance,
National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
174. See RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3240 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm, on
Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 164-71 (1987-88) (statement of Ralph
Nader, Center for the Study of Responsive Law); id. at 662-66 (statement of Pamela Gilbert, U.S
Public Interest Research Group and Public Citizens' Congress Watch); 1998 House Hearing, supra note
169, at 152-54 (statement of Susan Hill, President, National Women's Health Organization).
175. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS,
DECEMBER 31, 1990, at 33 (1990) (reporting 957 private RICO cases closed), with ADMIN. OFFICE OF
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 1993, at 27 (1993) (reporting 851
private RICO actions closed), and ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 1994, at 24 (1994) (reporting 841 private RICO cases closed). See also H.R.
REP. No. 102-312, at 27 (discussing Judge Rymer's statement describing the civil RICO caseload
problem as "exaggerated").
176. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat.
737, 758 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 1995, at 38 (1995) (reporting 905 private RICO cases
closed), with ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31,
1998, at 39 (1998) (reporting 795 private RICO cases closed), and ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 2000, at 39 (2000) (reporting 752 private RICO
cases closed).
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participate ... in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activities."'17 7 Some courts had construed this provision to
cover persons whose participation in the enterprise lacked any supervisory
or policymaking component.7 8 Both the ABA and the AFL-CIO urged
Congress to reject this position. They instead recommended modification
of § 1962(c) to specify that culpable participants must exercise either
managerial or supervisory responsibilities or else some form of
policymaking direction over the enterprise.' 79 The organized bar and
organized labor repeatedly offered these proposals to revise § 1962(c)
between 1985 and 1991.180
Second, and of greater relevance for present purposes, a different set
of reform proponents objected to the civil prosecution of advocacy groups
for engaging in a series of heated protests and demonstrations. Proposals to
limit the scope of extortion in the civil RICO setting were offered as early
as 1990 and again in 1998181 in response to actions brought against groups
and individuals who sought to block access to abortion clinics.
182
Importantly, the proposals were to reform civil RICO rather than to amend
the Hobbs Act. This legislative focus in turn reflects the unusual nature of
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
178. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11 th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978).
179. See 1985-86 House Hearings, supra note 90, at 1456 (citing a letter of October 11, 1985,
from Laurence Gold, General Counsel of AFL-CIO, proposing that "conduct or participate ... in the
conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), be defined as "to manage in a supervisory capacity the enterprise's basic
functions so as to further the enterprise's financial interests"); 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at
330 (testimony of Robert Chiesa, Chairman, Special RICO Coordinating Committee, ABA)
(recommending an amendment that would specify "that the conduct element requires some policy-
making power over the affairs of the enterprise").
180. Apart from sources cited supra note 179, the AFL-CIO proposal is in 1987 Senate Hearings,
supra note 167, at 304; and 1989 House Hearings, supra note 156, at 253. The ABA proposal is in 1991
House Hearing, supra note 167, at 144, 149. Additionally, the House Judiciary Committee twice
reported out bills providing that RICO civil remedies were to be used only "against major participants"
in criminal conduct. H.R. REP. No. 102-312, at 7. See also H.R. REP. No. 101-975, at 15 (1990).
181. See S. REP. No. 101-269, at 7 (1990) (reporting a proposed amendment to § 1962 offered by
Senator Humphrey and supported by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and Americans
United for Life, which would have excluded from the definition of "racketeering activity" all nonviolent
protests or demonstrations undertaken for reasons other than economic advantage); Civil RICO
Clarification Act of 1998, H.R. 4245, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998) (eliminating extortion as a predicate
offense for civil RICO purposes).
182. See, e.g., Ne. Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1989)
(upholding a broad district court jury instruction on extortion); United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380,
394 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming convictions for extortion where antiabortion protesters interfered with
victims' "right to conduct a business free from threats of violence and physical harm"); Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695, 709 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming a civil RICO award of
$257,000 and holding that the Hobbs Act covers protesters' actions interfering with clinics' rights to
deliver medical services), rev'd, 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
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the connection between the two federal statutes in that the proposed
reforms would not have changed either law outside the context of their
interaction.
Although the abortion-related circumstances of the proposed reforms
led to partisan divisions among members of the judiciary committees, 183
the amendment to restrict civil RICO suits alleging extortion against
nonviolent protesters received support from the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"). 184 The proposed revision also was endorsed by Robert
Blakey, who had helped draft RICO in 1970 as an aide to Senator
McClellan. Blakey urged legislators to clarify the difference between two
crimes: the RICO-included offense of extortion and the RICO-excluded
offense of coercion.' 85 Blakey elaborated on this distinction between
extortion-which "classically was a seizing of property"' 86 -and
coercion-which "is an interference with autonomy"' 87 -by invoking the
New York common law concept of extortion as incorporated into the
Hobbs Act.' 88
Neither the proposals to limit the scope of "conduct or participate" nor
the proposals to restrict the meaning of "extortion" were enacted by
Congress. These reforms, however, were effectively adopted by the
Supreme Court as part of its second generation of decisions interpreting
civil RICO.
B. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONSTRAINING CIVIL RICO
As previously discussed, a trio of early Supreme Court decisions
interpreted RICO provisions very broadly, indeed more broadly than the
enacting Congress would have wanted.189 By contrast, starting in 1993, the
Court decided a second generation of cases confining the reach of civil
RICO. 9 0 These later decisions were issued after unsuccessful efforts by
183. See, e.g., 1998 House Hearing, supra note 169, at 1-7 (reporting members' explanations of
their disagreements with respect to the antiabortion protests at issue).
184. See id. at 108-10 (statement of Louis Bogard, Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU); S. REP. No.
101-269, at 7.
185. See 1998 House Hearing, supra note 169, at 23-29 (statement of G. Robert Blakey).
186. Id. at 26.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 36-38 (discussing New York common law and the Hobbs Act, submitted as part of
written testimony).
189. See supra Part II.C (discussing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); H.J. Inc.
v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); and Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1),
501 U.S. 249 (1994)).
190. I refer here principally to Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); Scheidler v.
[Vol. 83:731
HeinOnline  -- 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 764 2009-2010
2010] CLAIMS OF RICO EXTORTIONAGAINST UNION CAMPAIGNS 765
Congress to override Sedima and otherwise to restrict the scope of civil
RICO's operation. The majority opinions continued to rely on the same
language-based approach used in the 1980s. 19 1 Yet the Court's constraining
interpretations echo post-Sedima proposals to modify this RICO
language-proposals that had failed to secure approval in Congress.
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the issue was whether an accounting
firm's conduct during a series of audits was sufficient to expose it to RICO
liability under § 1962(c).' 92 Resolving a split in the circuits, 193 the Court
held that individuals or entities must participate in the operation or
management of the enterprise itself in order to be subject to liability under
§ 1962(c). 194 Justice Blackmun for the majority rejected the Justice
Department's position, relying on close linguistic analysis to conclude that
the phrase "participate ... in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs"
requires some part in directing those affairs. 195 Blackmun dismissed efforts
to invoke RICO's "liberal construction" clause, a clause the Court had
embraced in its earlier expansive decisions;' 96 he explained that the clause
was "not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never
intended."'1
97
The Court's narrowing construction of § 1962(c) closely parallels the
ABA and AFL-CIO proposals to amend the section that had been offered
without success between 1985 and 1991.198 Although the majority resisted
arguments to impose an even narrower interpretation,' its decision to
National Organization for Women, Inc. (Scheidler I1), 537 U.S. 393 (2003); and Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 537 (2007). Two other cases narrowing the civil RICO scope, Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
547 U.S. 451 (2006); and Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000), are discussed briefly in footnotes. Not
every decision after 1993 restricts the scope of civil RICO. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions v.
King, 533 U.S. 158 (2001); Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. 249. But the thrust of the three key decisions is
important for our purposes.
191. The majorities in Beck, Scheidler II, Anza, and Wilkie do not rely at all on RICO legislative
history. The majority in Reves invokes legislative history in a supportive sense, to reinforce its basic
textual analysis. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179-83.
192. Id. at 173-77.
193. See id. at 177 (referencing a split in circuits).
194. Id. at 179, 184-85 (stating the "operation or management" test).
195. Id. at 177-79 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000)); id. at 171 (referencing the Justice
Department's position as amicus). The majority also invoked legislative history to reinforce its text-
based analysis, a portion of the opinion not joined by Justices Scalia or Thomas. See id. at 172 n.1, 179-
83.
196. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) (quoting Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989).
197. Reves, 507 U.S. at 183.
198. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
199. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 n.4 (disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit's suggestion that § 1962(c)
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restrict the scope of the "conduct or participate" language was important
and also controversial. In addition to the circuit split and the Justice
Department's opposition, dissenting Justices Souter and White objected
that the words of § 1962(c) were far from clear and the Court therefore
should have relied on the "liberal construction" clause as it had done in
prior cases.200
Ten years after Reves, the Court issued a second major decision
narrowing the scope of civil RICO, this time related to the concept of
extortion. 20 1 In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
(Scheidler If), the Court reviewed a RICO treble damages award against
abortion protesters based on lower court findings that the protesters had
violated federal and state extortion law.202 The issue before the Justices
following trial of the RICO claim was whether the protesters committed
extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which
forms the basis for extortion as a predicate offense under RICO.2 03 Writing
for an eight-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that because
the protesters did not "obtain property" from either the National
Organization for Women ("NOW") or the abortion clinics, there could be
no extortion under the Hobbs Act as a matter of law and the finding of a
RICO violation must be reversed.20 4
The majority emphasized that the Hobbs Act definition of extortion
was closely modeled on the Penal Code of New York, and that under New
York case law prior to the passage of the Hobbs Act, the "obtaining of
property" requirement included two distinct components: depriving another
of property and acquiring that property for oneself.20 5 The majority also
requires "significant control over or within an enterprise" (quoting Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers
Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (emphasis added))).
200. See id. at 187-89 (Souter and White, JJ., dissenting).
201. In the interim, the Court decided Beck v. Prupis, holding that a person injured by an overt act
undertaken in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy (in this instance terminating employees for refusing to
participate in RICO activities) does not have a cause of action under § 1962(c) because the overt act
was not otherwise wrongful under RICO. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 504-06 (2000).
202. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 537
U.S. 393 (2003). The Court had previously held that the clinics subjected to these protests had standing
under RICO even though the protesters lacked any economic motive for their conduct. See Nat'l Org.
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 256-62 (1994).
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (2006) (defining "racketeering activity" to include "any act
which is indictable under... section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion)"); Scheidler I1, 537 U.S. at 397 (discussing the issue presented).
204. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 402-11. The Hobbs Act defines "extortion" to mean "the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 195 l(b)(2) (emphasis added).
205. Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 403 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)).
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noted that the Court itself had embraced New York's two-pronged
approach when it construed the Hobbs Act in a seminal decision.2 °6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist then determined that the "acquisition" prong of the
"obtaining property" requirement had not been satisfied. The protesters
may have deprived clinic operators of a property right of exclusive control
over business assets, but they did not acquire such a right themselves: they
"neither pursued nor received 'something of value from' respondents that
they could exercise, transfer, or sell. 20 7 The majority added that apart from
vindicating the express language of the Hobbs Act, the requirement that
property be "obtained" comported with the longstanding distinction
between extortion and the separate crime of coercion under New York law.
Coercion was a lesser offense, one that did not involve acquisition of
property but rather the use of force or violence to compel or restrict the
actions and decisions of another-such as the use of force to compel a
business to enter into a labor agreement with a union.
20 8
Because the clinic protesters did not engage in extortion within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act, they did not commit a federal predicate offense
under RICO. For similar reasons, the majority reversed the lower court's
finding that the protesters had committed extortion under state law, a
distinct RICO predicate offense. Here, the majority relied on its own
precedents and the practice in most states to conclude that for RICO
purposes, conduct charged as a matter of state law "must be capable of
being generically classified as extortionate" consistent with Hobbs Act
requirements."' In a brief concurring opinion, Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer lauded the Court's unwillingness "to extend RICO's domain further
by endorsing the expansive definition of 'extortion' adopted by the Seventh
Circuit., 210 They also noted that the contrary position taken by NOW, and
also by the Justice Department, might well have made RICO extortion
applicable to the civil rights sit-ins of the 1960s.
211
The Court's approach in imposing constraints on the RICO predicate
206. See id. at 404 (discussing United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406 n.16 (1973)).
207. Id. at 405 (quoting United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290 (1969)).
208. See id. at 405-06 (relying specifically on People v. Kaplan, 269 N.Y.S. 161 (N.Y. App. Div.
1934)). Given the well-settled distinction between extortion and coercion, Congress's decision when
drafting the Hobbs Act to include extortion but omit coercion was significant in construing the scope of
the extortion provision. Id. at 406. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized there was some overlap between
the two crimes in that extortion requires using coercive conduct to obtain property, but he noted the
basic distinction between these offenses persists to the present day. Id. at 407-08.
209. Id. at 409; id. at 409-10 (relying inter alia on Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, and Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)).
210. Id. at 412 (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
211. See id. at 411 n.*.
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offense of extortion bears a marked resemblance to the positions urged by
groups and individuals who sought to amend RICO without success in the
1990s. Both Robert Blakey and the ACLU raised the civil rights analogy
when testifying before Congress in support of proposals to restrict the
scope of extortion.212 Blakey also testified specifically and at some length
about the need for an amendment to separate extortion from coercion,
invoking the Hobbs Act definition and its roots in New York law.213
Moreover, the Court's restrictive interpretation in 2003 was by no means
self-evident. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, circuit courts had
regularly held that using force or violence to attempt to compel a victim to
abandon its business operations qualified as extortion under the Hobbs Act
and RICO, and the executive branch fully supported this position. 214
Four years after Scheidler II, the Court reinforced its confining
approach to extortion in Wilkie v. Robbins.215 In Wilkie, the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") had allegedly engaged in a campaign of
administrative harassment and intimidation in an effort to force a Wyoming
rancher (Robbins) to re-grant an easement that had been previously
conferred by his predecessor. 216 Robbins brought suit against various BLM
officials under RICO alleging extortion and also under the Fifth
Amendment. The lower courts declined motions to dismiss both claims, but
the Supreme Court reversed.217
Writing for a unanimous Court on the RICO claims, Justice Souter
held that the Hobbs Act has no application when the federal government is
the intended beneficiary of allegedly extortionate conduct. 218 The Court
recognized that at common law the crime of extortion was aimed at public
officials. That offense, however, had addressed the harm of "public
corruption, by the sale of public favors for private gain," not injuries
resulting from "overzealous efforts to obtain property on behalf of the
Government., 219 The Court then rejected the separate RICO claim brought
212. See 1998 House Hearing, supra note 169, at 26 (statement of G. Robert Blakey); id. at 108-
10 (statement of Louis Bograd, Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU). See also sources cited supra note 181
(discussing a proposed 1990 amendment supported by the ACLU).
213. See 1998 House Hearing, supra note 169, at 36-40.
214. See Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 415-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 401 (majority opinion)
(discussing the Solicitor General's amicus brief).
215. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
216. Id. at 541-48.
217. Id. at 548-49.
218. Id. at 563.
219. Id. at 564. Justice Souter added that while the Hobbs Act had expanded the common law
offense to include private actors, Congress had "retain[ed] the core idea of extortion as a species of
corruption, akin to bribery." Id. at 564 n.12. The majority noted an earlier decision applying the Hobbs
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under a state blackmail statute, relying on Scheidler I's holding that
conduct not "capable of being generically classified as extortionate" cannot
survive on a theory of being derived from state law.
220
The Court also rejected Robbins's Fifth Amendment claim, which
alleged that he had been vindictively retaliated against by BLM officials for
refusing to grant an easement. 21 Writing for seven members, Justice Souter
addressed the lawfulness of the federal government's regulatory
harassment campaign, a course of conduct in important respects analogous
to union comprehensive campaigns.
Justice Souter acknowledged that BLM officials' coordinated effort to
pressure Robbins through a series of agency actions and lawsuits over a
period of six years had the capacity to "deplete[] the spirit along with the
purse." 222 Accordingly, the government's course of dealing warranted
analysis and review as a whole rather than simply the sum of its parts. The
majority concluded, however, that this campaign of regulatory harassment,
undertaken to further the legitimate purpose of securing access to a
neighbor's land, was a lawful form of hard bargaining aimed at improving
the federal government's negotiating position.
223
The Court recognized that a few instances of coercive government
conduct alleged by Robbins could, if proven, constitute unlawful behavior
going beyond hard bargaining. But the great majority of allegations
involved activities that fell within the government's legitimate enforcement
power.224 For the Court, the lawfulness of a hard bargaining campaign like
this one did not depend on the government's having a spiteful or malicious
motive. Rather, what transforms a campaign of hard bargaining into one of
Act to a union's use of violence and threats in order to secure jobs and pay for its members. There the
Court had stated that extortion did not require the person obtaining property to receive direct benefits.
Id. at 566 (discussing United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956)). It did not follow, however,
that the Hobbs Act or RICO were meant to apply to public officials in the absence of such direct
benefits. To hold otherwise could well allow the fear of civil claims for treble damages to "take the
starch out of regulators who are supposed to bargain and press demands vigorously on behalf of the
Government and the public." Id. at 567.
220. Id. at 567 (quoting Scheidler v. Nat'l. Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler 11), 537 U.S. 393, 409
(2003)).
221. See id. at 555-62.
222. See id. at 555.
223. See id. at 557-58. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from this holding;
on their view of the facts, viewed most favorably to Robbins on a motion to dismiss, the pattern of
severe and pervasive government harassment went beyond hard bargaining to something like "the
armed thug's demand: 'Your money or your life."' Id. at 580 n.7 (Ginsburg and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
224. See id. at 559-60 (majority opinion).
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unlawful retaliation is that "the antagonistic acts by the officials extend
beyond the scope of acceptable means for accomplishing the legitimate
purpose .... They are 'too much.' 225 In this instance, where at most a
small handful of government actions over six years extended beyond
acceptable means, there was no cognizable Fifth Amendment claim. To
allow such a claim based on the undue zeal of government employees in
exercising lawful enforcement powers would "invite an onslaught" of such
lawsuits thereby undermining overall government enforcement.226
The Court's decisions in Reves, Scheidler II, and Wilkie, limiting the
applicability of civil RICO, contrast sharply with the earlier expansive
majority opinions in Sedima and its progeny. These narrowing
constructions are especially interesting given the intervening RICO
developments in Congress. The failure to override Sedima or otherwise to
limit the scope of civil RICO despite prolonged and serious efforts suggests
Congress was prepared, however reluctantly, to tolerate RICO's intrusion
into a range of garden variety private business disputes. The failure to enact
specific statutory amendments narrowing "conduct or participate" under
§ 1962 or limiting "extortion" under § 1961 reinforces this perception. The
Court, however, was undeterred by these rejected congressional proposals.
In Reves and Scheidler II, it construed the unamended RICO provisions in
ways that effectively adopted restrictions comparable to what Congress had
failed to enact. In each case, the Court did so without even mentioning
Congress's unsuccessful efforts. On what basis might the Court simply
have ignored this rather high-profile legislative inaction?
C. DISREGARDING REJECTED CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS
There is an ongoing debate among judges and legal scholars about
whether to attribute meaning to congressional silence. 227 The strand of
legislative inaction doctrine arguably relevant here is the Rejected Proposal
Rule. When a conference committee, a chamber of Congress, or a standing
225. Id. at 558 n.10.
226. Id. at 562.
227. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (disagreeing with Justice
Scalia's dissent regarding the weight of Congress's failure to act); id. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority opinion's reliance on congressional inaction as support for its conclusion);
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (finding "positive inaction" when Congress repeatedly
rejected amendments to override earlier Supreme Court precedents). See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988) (discussing three
interpretive doctrines regarding the meaning of legislative inaction); John C. Grabow, Congressional
Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities, " 64 B.U. L.
REV. 737 (1984) (criticizing judicial reliance on congressional silence).
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committee has failed to approve certain language proposed to amend a
statute, the Court often refuses to construe the statute along the lines of the
unenacted proposal.228
Often is by no means always, however. William Eskridge has
identified numerous cases in which the Court refuses to attribute
significance to the fact a proposal has been rejected,229 and he maintains
that when doing so the Justices tend to emphasize how the rejected
proposal differs materially from the issue litigated before the Court.230
This factor may help explain the approach in Scheidler II. The
legislative proposals reported out of committee in 1990 and addressed
during committee hearings in 1998 would have excluded from RICO's
definition of "racketeering activities" all forms of nonviolent public speech
undertaken for noneconomic reasons, 231 or would have excluded from civil
RICO coverage any racketeering activity comprised of acts or threats
involving extortion. 232 The question before the Court in Scheidler II
involved the meaning of extortion as separately defined under the Hobbs
Act-whether the right to pursue certain individual or business activities
was "property" that had been "obtained" by clinic protesters under that
statute. 233 There also are differences between the issue litigated in Reves
and the relevant unsuccessful congressional proposals, although the
differences there seem less stark.234
228. See, e.g., Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338-39 & n.8 (1988) (inferring
significance from the failure of a proposal to receive committee approval); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (same); Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481
U.S. 429, 439-40 (1987) (inferring significance from the failure of a proposal on the floor of one
House); Univs. Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 777-80 (1981) (same). See also Eskridge,
supra note 227, app. 3 at 134-36 (listing twenty-seven Supreme Court decisions between 1962 and
1988 that inferred significance from inaction by a standing committee, and twenty-one Supreme Court
decisions in the same period that inferred significance from inaction on the floor of one chamber).
229. Eskridge, supra note 227, app. 3, at 134-37 (listing fourteen Supreme Court decisions
inferring no significance from inaction by a standing committee, and fourteen Supreme Court decisions
inferring no significance from inaction on the floor of one chamber).
230. See id. at 87-88 (examining two illustrative Supreme Court decisions).
231. See S. REP. No. 101-269, at 17 (1990) (describing the text of section 3 of the approved bill).
232. See Civil RICO Clarification Act of 1998, H.R. 4245, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998). This bill was
discussed at the 1998 House hearing. See 1998 House Hearing, supra note 169, at 5-10. An additional
bill introduced in the 105th Congress focused on the "obtaining of property" issue later decided by the
Court in Scheidler II, but no hearings were ever held related to this bill. See S. 2614, 105th Cong. § 2
(1998) (defining "extortion" for RICO purposes to require a taking of tangible or intangible property).
233. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler 11), 537 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2003).
234. Compare Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1993) (explaining a grant of
certiorari to resolve a circuit court split over whether § 1962(c) requires proof that a RICO defendant
has participated in the operation or management of the enterprise), with RICO Amendments Act of
1991, H.R. 1717, 102d Cong. § 3 (1991) (proposing to amend § 1964(c) to require that a RICO
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Still it is somewhat puzzling that the Court in Reves and Scheidler II
never even alluded to Congress's failed efforts to narrow the scope of the
RICO text it is called on to interpret. Given the Justices' general level of
interest in attempts to revise RICO,2 35 and the extended debates that took
place in committees on these particular matters, Congress's record of
inaction on RICO reform might have warranted some mention.
The Court's silence regarding rejected proposals in Congress may well
reflect a combination of influences at work. First, the parties' briefs
submitted to the Justices made virtually no mention of Congress's failed
efforts with respect to the meaning of § 1962(c) in Reves or the "obtaining
property" issue in Scheidler //. 23 6 These failures involved proposals to
modify or override lower court constructions of the 1970 RICO text rather
than Supreme Court interpretations. The parties evidently decided that
resolving tensions among various lower court rulings237 did not call for any
weight to be assigned to what was merely committee commentary on those
rulings.238 Additionally, some Justices are strongly opposed to relying on
congressional inaction for any reason. Justice Scalia has expressed this
defendant be a "major participant" in the criminal conduct responsible for the plaintiff's injury), and
sources cited supra notes 179-80 (proposing, on behalf of the AFL-CIO and ABA, that § 1962(c) be
amended to require that a civil RICO defendant exercise some supervisory or policymaking powers
over the affairs of the enterprise).
235. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (noting Congress's
inaction in four years since Sedima); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (inviting
Congress to correct the Court's expansive interpretation); Rehnquist, supra note 158, at 67.
236. The parties in Reves did not advance any rejected proposal arguments in their main briefs.
See Brief for Petitioners, Reves, 507 U.S. 170 (No. 91-886) (making no reference to legislative history);
Brief for the Respondent at 23-24, Reves, 507 U.S. 170 (No. 91-886) (relying only on the 1969-1970
legislative history). But see Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9 & n.2, Reves, 507 U.S. 170 (No. 91-886)
(relying briefly on Congress's failure to enact a specific "auditors' exemption" in 1985 and 1987 to
support its argument against judicial creation of such an exemption). In Scheidler II, petitioner
Operation Rescue invoked the 1998 House hearing testimony but only to illustrate its argument about
the risk of RICO's being used against civil rights protesters. See Brief for Petitioner Operation Rescue
at 27, Scheidler II, 537 U.S. 393 (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119). The respondents would have been the logical
party to invoke a congressional inaction argument based on the unsuccessful 1998 House proposal, but
they did not do so. See Brief for Respondents, Scheidler II, 537 U.S. 393 (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119).
Indeed, when the petitioners made their own legislative inaction argument, relying on the House's
failure to vote on a 1972 Senate amendment related to a separate issue in the case, the respondents
dismissed the argument as based on "particularly unreliable uses of legislative history." Id. at 44.
237. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 176-77 (discussing the circuit court split). See also supra note 182
(listing several circuit court decisions that affirmed findings of extortion by antiabortion advocacy
groups).
238. See James J. Brudney Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MACH. L. REv. 1, 66-68, 95-97 (1994) (discussing unreliability
of committee report commentary disapproving of judicial interpretation with respect to a textual
provision that is not being corrected or modified).
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view in unequivocal terms,2 39 and Justice Kennedy seems similarly
disinclined.240
In the end, though, the Court did more than simply ignore Congress's
inaction. The decisions in Reves and Scheidler II are consistent with
constraints unsuccessfully pursued by Congress, and these legislative
efforts may well have encouraged the Justices to revisit their prior hands-
off approach. By the 1990s, a number of Justices had expressed a visceral
discomfort with civil RICO's profound effect on private litigation and its
federalization of areas formerly reserved to state common law. 241 The
Court could have curtailed the initial flood of RICO civil actions back in
the 1980s, but a bare majority in Sedima concluded they were estopped
from doing so by the text Congress had enacted.242 Subsequently, however,
the Justices apparently determined that their decisions should foreclose
additional expansions of RICO's scope, just as their recent decision in
Wilkie foreclosed an analogous constitutional cause of action to avoid
opening new floodgates.
243
Regardless of whether these second-generation decisions reflect
primarily an abiding concern over the further expansion of civil RICO or a
more conventional doctrinal analysis, the Court in effect decided that
congressional gridlock was evidence of an inability to resolve widely
perceived problems. Having discounted Congress's failure to enact RICO
reform, the Court has signaled a willingness to exercise its own constraints
when interpreting the language and concepts of civil RICO. That
willingness helps to frame and guide an appropriate solution for the
extortion cause of action at issue.
239. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750-52 (2006); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1072, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372-73 (2004).
241. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.). See also supra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text (describing Rehnquist's speech urging RICO reform).
242. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1985).
243. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)).
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IV. RICO, UNIONS, AND EXTORTIONATE CONDUCT
A. KEY DEFINITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING EXTORTION UNDER THE
HOBBS ACT
Initially, it is important to recognize that federal labor law legitimates
and indeed protects what might in ordinary meaning terms be thought of as
extortionate activity. Section 7 of the NLRA establishes that employees
working with unions have rights to organize and to bargain collectively
with their employers. They also have the right, in broader terms, "to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or
protection. "244 These lawful concerted activities can extend well beyond
the immediate employer-employee relationship, 245 and lawful conduct
outside that relationship is often part of a tough bargaining strategy to
impose economic pressure on a business.
Activities such as rallies, protests, staged media events, and also
appeals to agencies, legislatures, or courts, are undertaken with the aim of
instilling a fear of economic loss that will encourage management to reach
an agreement with the union. As discussed in Part IV.B, constitutional
protections may arguably attach to this range of activities when engaged in
by any group, not just unions. In addition, however, the NLRA accords
special statutory protection when it is workers and unions who undertake
such activities to advance their cause. In attempting to reconcile federal
labor law with RICO, the key issue is what distinguishes this type of hard
bargaining by unions from extortion as defined under the Hobbs Act, which
is the indictable offense specified in RICO.
1. Is the Employer's Property Obtained?
As labor relations scholars have observed, union comprehensive
campaigns typically feature either organizing-related or bargaining-related
objectives.246 The union seeks a neutrality agreement or card check
recognition in the organizing setting, and it is pursuing an initial or
244. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
245. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (holding that the "mutual aid or
protection" clause protects employee efforts to "improve their lot as employees through channels
outside the immediate employee-employer relationship"); Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285,
1290 (6th Cir. 1998) (protecting employees' complaints to their employers' clients about working
conditions); Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232, 586 F.2d 691, 694 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978)
(observing that the definition of a labor dispute under the NLRA is very broad and stating that "[r]arely
have courts found concerted union activity to fall outside this broad definition").
246. See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
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renewed collective bargaining agreement in the post-recognition context.
These campaigns aim to compel the employer to enter into some kind of
agreement with the union. The campaigns clearly are coercive in
attempting to restrict the employer's freedom of action. But are they also
extortionate as contemplated in Scheidler II? Do the union or employees
receive something of value from the employer-property that the union can
"exercise, transfer, or sell"? 24 7
Applying the analysis under Scheidler II, one can see the argument
that the union's campaign interferes with an employer's intangible property
rights but the union does not acquire any such property. A comprehensive
campaign is an attempt to deprive the employer of its rights to exercise
exclusive control over its business assets. The employer is being pressured
to restrict or abandon its right to control the nature of the union recognition
process covering its own employees, or the right to refuse to engage in
collective bargaining with the union.24 8 The employer also is denied its
right to do business with its customers free from repeated verbal attacks on
its goodwill and reputation. These rights may qualify as intangible property
rights,249 and the campaign surely represents an effort to coerce the
employer into diminished exercise of those property rights. As in Scheidler
II, however, the perpetrators of this barrage of criticism are not attempting
to obtain the property rights that are the object of their coercive campaign.
Unions do not seek to exercise for themselves, or to sell or transfer, the
employer's right to refuse to enter into a neutrality agreement, or to oppose
card check recognition or collective bargaining.
Admittedly, there is a difference between the antiabortion protesters in
Scheidler II, whose "ultimate goal [was] 'shutting down' a clinic that
performed abortions,"250 and the union protesters in a comprehensive
247. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler I), 537 U.S. 393,405 (2003).
248. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. SEIU, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Roman
Restoration, Inc. v. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n of the U.S. & Can. Local No.
8, No. 07-2991 (RBK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49940, at *4-12 (D.N.J. June 30, 2008).
249. Congress has overridden one Supreme Court decision holding that deprivations of "property"
under the mail fraud statute did not include deprivations of an intangible right to honest services. See
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2006)). But cf Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2000) (stating that Congress's override
of the Court's previous decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), did not resolve
questions about whether forms of public corruption other than the public's right to honest services may
qualify as property rights under the mail fraud statute). The Court in Scheidler II was careful to avoid
overturning the Second Circuit's conclusion that intangible rights may qualify as property under the
Hobbs Act. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6 (declining to reach, much less reject, the holding in
United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969)).
250. Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 405.
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campaign, whose ultimate goal typically involves not an employer's
shutdown but rather its continued operation under economic terms and
conditions more favorable to the employees. 21  The fact that union
campaigns aim to secure economic adjustments for "their side" in the
context of an ongoing business relationship makes the issue of whether
property is being acquired seem more complex.
Even with respect to less tangible property rights, there may be room
for debate. One lower court has distinguished Scheidler II in a labor setting,
holding that individuals active in organized crime obtained certain
intangible property rights when they exercised those rights for their own
ends. 25 2 In United States v. Gotti, the Second Circuit affirmed the extortion
conviction of union officials and others who had sought to exercise for
themselves the statutory rights of union members to free speech and
democratic participation in union affairs.253 The evidence was that the
defendants had directed delegates to vote for particular leadership
candidates and had controlled elected officials' performance of their jobs-
all in a way that yielded personal financial gains for the defendants. 254 The
Gotti court concluded this satisfied the "exercise, transfer, or sell" test
under Scheidler II, adding that analogously culpable conduct by
antiabortion protesters might include forcing clinic staff to provide entirely
new kinds of medical services or to turn all operations over to the
protesters.2 55
Nonetheless, unions in comprehensive campaigns are not exercising or
attempting to exercise that kind of control. The analogy between union
goals and the clinic protesters' goals in Scheidler II is especially clear with
respect to neutrality and card check agreements. These agreements do not
seek to control employers' economic assets or employees' less tangible
rights of participation; they simply establish a process or ground rules
under which the union can then make its sales pitch to the employees.256
251. In exceptional cases, a union campaign may seek to drive a corporate target out of business
in the hope that the union will have a better chance to reach agreement with the target's purchaser or
successor. See S. REP. No. 102-111, at 22 (1991) (describing how once an employer hires permanent
replacements during a strike, the union may feel compelled to work toward displacement of current
management or sale of the firm). A union campaign aimed at forcing the company out of business may
be deemed to have an illegitimate or wrongful purpose. See Tex. Air Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n
Int'l, No. 88-0804, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11149, at *16-17 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 1989).
252. United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006).
253. Id. at 302-06, 350. See also United States v. Gotti, No. 02 CR 606 (ILG), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25177, at *9-18 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2002) (identifying defendants and charges).
254. See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 325.
255. See id. at 324-25.
256. See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Unlike in Gotti, the union does not acquire or effectively exercise the
employees' right to choose or reject union representation; it is the
employees themselves who must still decide whether to select the union as
their bargaining representative.
257
In contrast to neutrality and card check, traditional property assets are
more directly at stake in a collective bargaining agreement. The union
typically seeks to extract pay increases, health benefits, and other
improvements in working conditions that have a tangible economic value.
Yet even when the campaign's goal is an initial or renewed collective
bargaining agreement, the union is not seeking to acquire something of
value to be exercised for its benefit as contemplated under Scheidler II or
Gotti.258 A collective bargaining relationship offers elements of value to
both the employer and the employees.259 In this respect, it differs from a
competitor's business asset that is subject to appropriation for the financial
profit of the union or its leaders.260 Rather than being regarded in suspect
terms, collective bargaining agreements are viewed under federal law as
presumptively iconic. In addition to offering distinct benefits to firms and
workers, these agreements promote the congressionally approved public
policy objectives of labor relations stability and peace.261
That so many employers choose to resist reaching either neutrality and
card check agreements or collective bargaining agreements indicates
resistance is highly prized by the business community. Still, it is not easy to
envision how the union obtains this right to resist in the way such
257. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Jarley and Maranto's findings that
organizing-related campaigns do not guarantee union success even if a neutrality or card check
agreement is reached, and employers' understanding of that fact).
258. See Roman Restoration Inc. v. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n of the
U.S. & Can. Local No. 8, No. 07-2991 (RBK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49940, at *7-11 (D.N.J. June 30,
2008).
259. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 7-22 (1984)
(reporting that unions raise wages and fringe benefits for workers and diminish wage inequality within
the unionized workforce and that unions also reduce employee quit rates, improve workforce stability,
and in many economic sectors improve productivity due to lower rates of turnover, enhanced
managerial performance in response to the union challenge, and more cooperative labor-management
relations at the plant or office level).
260. See Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213-14 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(holding that allegations of extortion under RICO survived a motion to dismiss where crab boat owners
competing with the plaintiff sought through various coercive activities to gain control of the plaintiff's
right to harvest crab during crab season).
261. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (purpose statement). This iconic perspective may relate more to
whether a property transfer is wrongful than to whether a transfer of tangible property is taking place.
See infra Part IV.A.2. But see Interstate Flagging, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 283 F. Supp. 2d 641,646-47
(D. Conn. 2003) (relying on Scheidler H to hold that union efforts to insist on certain job preferences
did not amount to obtaining property from another).
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acquisition has been understood under the Hobbs Act. But assuming
arguendo that unions in comprehensive campaigns are somehow seeking to
obtain an employer's right to refuse to reach an agreement, the next
question is what exactly is the basis for that employer right?
2. Is the Employer Wrongfully Induced by Fear of Economic Loss?
Just as Scheidler II provides the clearest insights into the meaning of
"obtain property," the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Enmons
establishes the framework for analyzing whether a union's use of "force,
violence, or fear" is "wrongful" under the Hobbs Act.262 Enmons involved
the use of force and violence during a lawful strike that resulted in damage
to company property. The Court held that while "wrongful" seems to
modify an extortionist's three main identified methods of obtaining
property (violence, force, or fear), the term must mean something else.2 63 A
reference to "wrongful violence" or "wrongful force" would be redundant
inasmuch as the use of violence or force to obtain another's property is
inherently wrongful.264 Instead, the Court reasoned, "wrongful" covers
only situations in which "the obtaining of the property would itself be
'wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that
property."265
Applying this ends-oriented construction of "wrongful," the Enmons
Court held that violence in support of a lawful strike cannot qualify as
Hobbs Act extortion although it may well constitute a state criminal
offense.266 The Court's understanding of legitimate labor ends included not
only the effort in Enmons to secure a new collective bargaining agreement
providing already-represented employees with higher wages, but also
efforts to organize a group of employees in support of union
representation. 267 By contrast, threats of force or violence to promote an
unlawful labor objective-such as personal payoffs to union officials or
wage payments for superfluous or unwanted services-are actionable under
the federal statute.268 The majority opinion invoked decades of circuit court
precedent to support its conclusion that the Act does not prohibit the use of
262. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1973)).
263. Id. at 399.
264. Id. at 399-400.
265. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
266. Seeid. at411-12.
267. See id. at 398 (seeking a new collective bargaining agreement); id. at 406 n.16 (seeking to
organize workers).
268. See id. at 400, 406 n.16.
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force to achieve legitimate labor objectives. 269
The Enmons holding applies a fortiori to property obtained through
fear of economic injury, which, unlike force or violence, is not inherently
suspect as a form of pressure. 270 Since Enmons, the lower courts have
developed an approach to distinguishing lawful from wrongful objectives
that covers all Hobbs Act allegations involving fear of economic loss, not
simply allegations growing out of a labor dispute. As the Third Circuit
observed in a leading nonlabor case, "[T]he fear of economic loss is a
driving force of our economy that plays an important role in many
legitimate business transactions." 271 Accordingly, when one side to a
business transaction uses fear of financial loss as leverage to engage in hard
bargaining, the Hobbs Act does not cover such exploitative efforts so long
as the exploiting party has a legitimate claim to the property. 272 At the same
time, the so-called "claim of right" defense is negated when the alleged
extortion victim "has a pre-existing entitlement to pursue his business
interests free of the fear he is quelling by receiving value in return for
transferring property to the defendant., 273  Put differently, what
distinguishes lawful hard bargaining from wrongful Hobbs Act extortion is
whether one party is entitled by law to be free from the economic fear
being generated by the other party's nonviolent yet coercive pressure
tactics.2
74
In the context of labor relations, an employer has a right to be free
from the fear caused by union campaign activities if the union's conduct
would be prohibited under relevant labor statutes. 275 Moreover, the scope
269. See id. at 408-10.
270. The Enmons Court concluded that "wrongful" was meant to and did modify all three terms-
force, violence, and fear. Id. at 399 & n.2. The decision was controversial among some members of
Congress insofar as it immunized from Hobbs Act prosecution violent conduct in furtherance of
legitimate union objectives. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 3832 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond
accompanying the introduction of S. 2189, a bill to override Enmons); 127 CONG. REC. 3407 (1981)
(remarks of Sen. Thurmond accompanying the introduction of S. 613, a bill to override Enmons). But
the focus on wrongful purpose was widely accepted with respect to the presumptively lawful means of
fear of economic loss. See, e.g., United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1981).
271. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 523 (3d Cir. 1998).
272. Id. at 523-24; United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1989); Clemente, 640 F.2d
at 1076-78.
273. Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 525 (quoting Viacom Int'l v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205, 213
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991)).
274. See United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2008); George Lussier Enters.,
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 393 F.3d 36, 50 (lst Cir. 2004); United States v. Tobin, 155 F.3d
636, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1998) (Alito, J.); McLaughlin Equip. Co. v. Servaas, No. IP98-0127-C-T/G, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13939, at *99-105 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2004).
275. Although the NLRA is the labor statute under which these campaigns are most often
assessed, union conduct or objectives could be evaluated under the Railway Labor Act, the Federal
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of prohibited union conduct extends beyond what might be viewed as
corrupt activity. Thus, it would be wrongful under the Hobbs Act to engage
in labor picketing or other coercive tactics in an effort to secure a collective
bargaining agreement for a union that is not authorized to represent a
majority of employees.2 76 Similarly, it would be problematic under the
Hobbs Act for a union to demand that supervisors be included in a
collective bargaining unit of nonsupervisors given that the NLRA
definition of "employee" excludes supervisory personnel.277 Union
pressures undertaken with the announced aim of forcing the employer to
shut down entirely or to sell its business also might be deemed suspect
under the Act.2 78
On the other hand, if the union's demands are in pursuit of a lawful
labor relations objective under the NLRA, then an employer has no right to
be free from the coercive economic pressure associated with those
demands. Union objectives that are legitimate under the NLRA include the
goal of negotiating a new or continuing collective bargaining agreement on
behalf of employees who have authorized the union to represent them. The
achievement of such an agreement setting terms and conditions of
employment is in fact the ultimate objective Congress had in mind when
enacting the NLRA.279
A union's effort to secure a neutrality agreement in aid of organizing
efforts also is plainly a lawful objective. The NLRA for more than sixty
years has promoted contractual arrangements between management and
unions as conducive to labor peace. 280 Such arrangements, including
employer agreements to refrain from objecting to a union or to recognize a
union upon proof of majority support secured outside the NLRB elections
context, have long been regarded as important contributors to stable labor
Labor Relations Act, and perhaps other labor-related laws as well.
276. See A. Terzi Prods. v. Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F. Supp. 2d 485, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (Sotomayor, J.); C & W Constr. Co. v. Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 687 F. Supp. 1453, 1457
(D. Haw. 1988).
277. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006); Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Cent. States, Se. &
Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 722 F. Supp. 1472, 1475-76 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
278. See Mariah Boat, Inc. v. Laborers Int'l Union, 19 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (S.D. Ill. 1998)
(holding that if the union's "sole objective [were] running [the employer] out of business," such
conduct may be considered a predicate act); Tex. Air Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, No. 88-0804, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11149, at *16-17 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 1989) (holding that the forced sale of a business
is not a "legitimate labor objective" (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404 (1973))).
279. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (setting forth the Act's basic findings and purposes); id. § 158(a)(5),
(b)(3), (d) (describing both sides' duty to bargain in good faith in an effort to reach agreement).
280. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes contracts between unions and employers
enforceable in federal court. See Brudney, supra note 56, at 847-48 (discussing the lawfulness of
neutrality agreements in detail).
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relations. 281 Neutrality agreements might raise issues of legitimacy if they
were effectively a form of premature recognition stifling genuine employee
choice.2 82 But the employees themselves are in no way bound by neutrality
agreements-they remain free to express opposition to the union, and in
fact a sizeable number continue to do so.
283
Finally, the union objective of securing a voluntary card check
arrangement, with or without a neutrality agreement, is entirely lawful
under the NLRA. Nonelectoral pathways to securing representative status
have been approved under the NLRA since 1935.184 Although a "preferred"
status is accorded to recognition via election, there are a number of
circumstances in which a majority card showing is sufficient to require that
employers bargain with their union.285 And employers are always permitted
to enter voluntarily into a bargaining relationship with a union that
possesses a card majority.2 86
To be sure, employers also have rights under the NLRA. In particular,
they have a right in the organizing setting to share with employees their
281. See Raley's & Commercial Workers' Union, Local 558, 336 N.L.R.B. 374, 385-86 (2001);
Goldsmith-Louison Cadillac Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 520, 522 (1990); Alpha Beta Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 228,
229-30 (1989); Cam Indus., 251 N.L.R.B. 11, 11 (1980), enforced, 666 F.2d 411, 412-14 (9th Cir.
1982); S.B. Rest of Framingham, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 506, 507-08 (1975).
282. See Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961) (finding a
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) based on the concern that an employer's granting exclusive
representative status to a union supported by only a minority of employees provides "a deceptive cloak
of authority with which [the union can] persuasively elicit additional employee support").
283. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 53 (2001) (reporting that unions lost approximately one
out of five organizing campaigns in which they relied on neutrality and card check, and one-half of all
campaigns involving neutrality agreements alone). Employees' opposition may on occasion trigger
hostility from the union or its supporters, but instances of improper pressure or reprisal can be fully
addressed through existing NLRB procedures. See Brudney, supra note 56, at 848 n. 134 (citing NLRB
and circuit court decisions).
284. From 1935 to 1947, the NLRB was authorized to certify a union as a majority representative
based simply on the showing of a card majority. Congress in 1947 restricted NLRB certification to
NLRB election victories, but specified that employers remained obligated to recognize and bargain with
a union designated by an employee majority even outside an NLRB election. See Brudney, supra note
56, at 857.
285. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 600 n.17 (1969). The preferred status from
certification includes a one-year bar on elections, a bar that a successor employer must honor as well.
Id. at 588-89 & n.14. Cards are sufficient, however, if unfair labor practices seriously disrupt the
election process or if employers themselves collected "the evidence" through polls, interrogation, or
third-party card check. See Brudney, supra note 56, at 857-58.
286. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 436 (2007) (noting that voluntary recognition of a union with
majority support is "undisputedly lawful"). The provision in § 159(a) indicating that members may be
"designated or selected" by a majority of employees contemplates that employers and employees may
agree to enter into a collective bargaining relationship without waiting for an NLRB-supervised
election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (emphasis added). See also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595-600.
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opposition to having a union and also the right to demand an election rather
than accede to a card check majority.28 7 And in a postrecognition context,
employers have a right to reject in good faith any collective bargaining
proposals put forward by the union.288 That employers enjoy these rights to
resist union efforts at organizing or collective bargaining does not mean,
however, that they have a right to be free from fears associated with union
efforts to achieve their own legitimate labor objectives. Indeed, the effort to
create a legal framework for addressing the conflicting objectives of unions
and employers is what gave rise to the fundamental national policy of the
NLRA-deferring to labor-management bargains reached on the basis of
each side's ability to exert economic pressure on the other. Accordingly, it
is not surprising that both the NLRB and the appellate courts have upheld
the basic lawfulness of neutrality agreements with or without card check
provisions.
289
B. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING UNION ACTIVITIES AS
POTENTIALLY EXTORTIONATE
1. Are the Union's Key Campaign Tactics Constitutionally Protected?
For the reasons just presented, Hobbs Act extortion would seem not to
encompass union efforts to coerce employers into signing a neutrality, card
check, or collective bargaining agreement. These union efforts do not
amount to the obtaining of property, and the union's objectives also are not
wrongful--on the contrary they are a central part of the federal labor law
enterprise. Beyond this, there remains the question whether unions'
prototypical comprehensive campaign methods may be regarded as
actionable under the Hobbs Act and RICO. This question of wrongful
means in turn implicates First Amendment considerations on which the
Supreme Court has offered substantial guidance. With respect to two types
of activities that form the core of union comprehensive campaigns-
287. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (protecting employer speech that does not include promises or
threats); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406-09 (1953) (approving captive audience
speeches); Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304-10 (1974) (approving an employer's right
to demand an election without evidence of a good faith doubt as to the reliability of the union's card
majority).
288. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (indicating that the duty of good faith does not include an obligation
to reach agreement); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (determining that the penalty
for bad faith does not include compelled agreement to terms or conditions).
289. See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374-76 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Employees
Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at
436-37.
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sharing disparaging information with neutral third parties and petitioning
government for redress-the Court's decisions suggest that the First
Amendment presents a formidable barrier to civil RICO claims for
extortion.
a. Negative Publicity Efforts
Looking first at a union's publicity activities, in its 1988 decision in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council, the Court held that a union may lawfully undertake an
informational campaign criticizing an employer's business practices and
urging consumers and other neutral parties to stay away. 90 DeBartolo
involved the union's effort to generate a consumer boycott at a shopping
mall where one tenant allegedly paid substandard wages and benefits.
29
'
The NLRA prohibits unions from using picketers to threaten or coerce third
parties into boycotting an employer's business.2 92 The Court, however,
voiced serious doubts that this prohibition would be constitutional if
applied to handbilling or other forms of disparaging expression
unaccompanied by the inherently threatening presence of picketers.293 In
order to avoid such First Amendment problems, the Court held that unions
may appeal to customers or other third parties to boycott the company,
using essentially any form of expressive communication besides physical
picketing.
294
DeBartolo's constitutionally influenced construction of the NLRA
provides unions with protection comparable to what civil rights
organizations and other advocacy groups enjoy when using social pressure
or the threat of social ostracism to alter business behavior. 295 One court of
appeals expressed similar constitutional motivations when considering a
union's campaign of public disparagement that involved organizing-related
objectives.2 96 The union had engaged in a series of negative publicity
activities aimed at pressuring a third-party business to help the union secure
a neutrality and card check agreement with one of the business's major
290. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575-80 (1988).
291. Id. at 570.
292. See id. at 578 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)).
293. See id. at 580 (explaining that picketing, as "a mixture of conduct and communication," is
qualitatively different from other modes of communication (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees,
447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
294. See id. at 580-83.
295. See id. at 576; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902-15 (1982); Org. for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
296. See Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees, 239 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2001).
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contractors.297 This campaign of leaflets, rallies, and other public
criticism--directed at the third party's board of directors as well as its
donors and patrons--clearly involved harassing forms of communication
intended to coerce the third-party neutral into action.298 But the Second
Circuit concluded that "unless we are to depart from settled First
Amendment principles, [the activities] are constitutionally protected.- 299
Such constitutionally influenced protection does not automatically
extend to unions' disparaging communications when they are expressed in
a form other than picketing. The Supreme Court has held that the content of
union speech may be actionable under state defamation or libel law if the
negative publicity directed toward an employer is shown to be knowingly
or recklessly false and to cause actual damage. 300 At the same time, the
Court has made clear that this state law cause of action based on knowing
or reckless falsehoods is to be narrowly drawn, because federal labor policy
protects freedom of speech quite apart from First Amendment
considerations.3" 1 In this regard, the Court has observed that labor disputes
are "ordinarily heated affairs" and that union campaigns regularly fall short
of being actionable under state libel law even when the campaigns are
"characterized by bitter and extreme charges.... unfounded rumors,
vituperations[,]. . misrepresentations[,] and distortions." 30 2
The Court's cautious approach to state law civil actions restricting
union speech based on content parallels its announced reluctance to outlaw
any union speech under the NLRA unless the speech is joined to some form
of physical intimidation. Accordingly, efforts to penalize a union's negative
publicity efforts under the Hobbs Act-even if those efforts are
vituperative or distortive-would likely not survive constitutional
scrutiny.30
3
297. Id. at 174-75.
298. See id. at 175 (describing activities such as chanting and distributing pamphlets at rallies in
front of the main business entrance, sending letters to the business's directors and donors, and asking
donors to discontinue their contributions); id. at 177 (noting the lower court's finding that the union
acted with a coercive motive).
299. Id. at 178. See also Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 195-97 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding the dismissal of the employer's state
law challenge to a union negative publicity campaign).
300. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966).
301. See Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 271-73 (1974).
302. Linn, 383 U.S. at 58 (quoted with approval in Austin, 418 U.S. at 272).
303. Justices Souter and Kennedy alluded to the possibility of dismissing RICO extortion claims
on this First Amendment basis. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32 (discussing the concurring
opinion in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 263-65
(1994) (Souter, J., concurring)).
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b. Efforts to Petition the Three Branches
Union comprehensive campaigns almost invariably include efforts to
obtain some form of government action against the employer. A union may
lobby for local, state, or federal legislation that would restrict or harm the
employer's business interests; it may pressure agency officials to apply or
enforce regulatory requirements against the employer; and it may initiate
lawsuits against the employer on matters directly or indirectly related to
employment conditions. The right to petition government is expressly
protected in the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court has long been
clear that it will not "lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade" this
right.30 4
Through a series of antitrust decisions, the Court construed the
Sherman Act to avoid impinging on one business entity's ability to invoke
governmental processes against a competitor. In its decision in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Court
held that concerted efforts by an association of railroads to influence the
passage and enforcement of laws harmful to the trucking industry did not
give rise to a violation of the antitrust laws. 30 5 Even if the sole purpose of
such a lobbying campaign were to destroy a competitor's business, the
right to petition government is not at all a function of the petitioners'
anticompetitive motives. 306 In construing the Act to avoid burdening the
lobbying activities of economically self-interested parties, the Court
explained that its position also furthered governmental objectives because
those with a financial interest in a public policy issue are often valuable
sources of information. 30 7
Since Noerr, the Court has reiterated its commitment to interpreting
federal statutes so as to shield private parties' attempts to influence public
officials in different venues. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the
Court held that efforts by the union and mine operators to pressure two
federal agencies into regulatory actions that would raise employees' wage
levels were not illegal under antitrust law, either on their own or as part of
a broader anticompetitive scheme. 30 8 Once again the Court specified that
even though restraint of trade was an intended consequence of government
intervention, the joint efforts to influence public officials were not
304. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
305. See id. at 135-36.
306. Id. at 138-40.
307. Id. at 139.
308. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965).
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themselves illegal. 309 Then, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of immunity
from antitrust liability to the filing of lawsuits in state or federal court. 31°
And in BE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB, the Court applied Noerr-
Pennington principles in the federal labor law setting, holding that an
employer is substantially protected from NLRA liability for its retaliatory
and unsuccessful litigation against a union.3
11
The Court's use of the constitutional avoidance canon to shelter
petitioning conduct from federal regulation does not mean that private
parties are entirely immune from statutory liability when they petition
government. The majority in Noerr identified the possibility of a "sham
exception" had the railroads not been making a genuine effort to influence
legislation and law enforcement practices. 312 Subsequently, the Court has
elaborated on the meaning of sham petitioning in the litigation context. It
remains the case that a plaintiffs subjective intent to interfere with a
defendant's competitive position (or with its exercise of statutory rights)
through litigation is not sufficient to abrogate Noerr-Pennington
immunity.313 Rather, a sham lawsuit must be not only subjectively
retaliatory but also "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." 314 Circuit courts
applying this sham litigation standard have been generally unwilling to find
objective baselessness, invoking the First Amendment foundations of
Noerr-Pennington.315
Further, a number of circuits have accorded broad protection to
petitioning conduct when construing other federal statutes. 316 Importantly,
309. Id. at 670.
310. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). See also Prof'l
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993).
311. BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525-37 (2002). See also Bill Johnson's Rests.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741-44 (1983).
312. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
313. See Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. at 60-61 (safeguarding petitioning conduct that
attempts to interfere with a competitive position); BE&K Constr., 536 U.S. at 530-31 (safeguarding
petitioning conduct that attempts to interfere with statutory rights under the NLRA).
314. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. at 60.
315. See, e.g., Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2000); White v.
Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2000); Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp. 168 F.3d 119, 122-
27 (3d Cir. 1999).
316. See, e.g., Herr v. Pequea Twp., 274 F.3d 109, 118-19 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the immunity
doctrine to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)), overruled on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003); White, 227 F.3d at 1231-33 (applying the
immunity doctrine to the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631); Tarpley v. Keistler, 188
F.3d 788, 794-95 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the immunity doctrine to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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the Ninth Circuit recently relied on Noerr-Pennington to guide its
interpretive approach in a civil RICO action. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.
involved over 100,000 prelawsuit demand letters sent by DIRECTV. 17 The
letters alleged that Sosa and other purchasers of certain programming
equipment had illegally accessed DIRECTV's satellite television signal,
and they threatened civil lawsuits unless the purchasers forfeited their
equipment to DIRECTV and reached a monetary settlement.31 8 Sosa and
many others settled the claims and then sued DIRECTV alleging extortion
under RICO.319
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the RICO action burdened
DIRECTV's ability to settle legal claims prior to filing a lawsuit, and that
imposing such burdens on the transmission of prelitigation demand letters
would violate the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.3 20 In reaching
this conclusion, the appellate court relied on the notion of First Amendment
"breathing space" derived from earlier Supreme Court free speech cases
321
and extended to the Petition Clause setting in the Court's BE&K
decision.322 The majority in BE&K had suggested that even baseless
lawsuits, like false statements, may deserve some protection from NLRA
challenges so as not to chill potential litigants from bringing more
meritorious cases to court.3 23 The Court then stressed that unsuccessful yet
reasonably based suits actually advance First Amendment interests such as
allowing the "public airing of disputed facts" 324 and promoting the law's
evolution "by supporting the development of legal theories that may not
gain acceptance the first time around., 325 Relying on these Supreme Court
precedents, the Ninth Circuit in Sosa determined there was also a close
connection between presuit demand letters and access to the courts, and
that the threat of a treble damages remedy with respect to such letters raised
substantial Petition Clause concerns.3 26 The court went on to interpret
RICO and the Hobbs Act as precluding the maintenance of an extortion
action except in instances (unlike this one) in which the prelitigation
317. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2006).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 926-27.
320. See id. at 932-36.
321. See id. at 933 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-42 (1974)).
322. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531-32 (2002).
323. Id. at 531.
324. Id. at 532 (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)).
325. Id.
326. Sosa, 437 F.3d at 936-37.
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demand letters amounted to a sham. 327
The upshot of the Noerr-Pennington line of cases is that the Supreme
Court, when confronted with a claim against a civil defendant that involves
retaliatory lobbying or litigation, will construe federal antitrust and labor
laws to avoid burdening the defendant's right of access to courts, agencies,
or legislatures. The Ninth Circuit's extension of this constitutional
avoidance approach to the RICO extortion setting is entirely consistent
with the Court's precedents. Indeed, given its provisions for treble damages
and attorney's fees, RICO's potential to chill petitioning conduct is at least
equivalent to that of antitrust law and much stronger than the potential of
the NLRA. 328 And again, the protection accorded here is not unlimited-it
does not extend to lawsuits that are objectively baseless. 329
2. Is the Union Campaign as a Whole Unlawful Even If Most of Its Parts
Are Not?
Assuming that most of the union's complaints to courts and agencies
are not objectively baseless, there remains the question whether a series of
these legal actions, perhaps combined with a stream of negative publicity
directed at the employer, may cumulatively be deemed unlawful as an
extortionate abuse of governmental processes. The Supreme Court has
hinted at such a possibility in its antitrust decisions discussing what
constitutes sham petitioning.33 The Court at an early point suggested that a
deluge of meritless claims effectively barring a competitor from its own
327. See id. at 942. See also Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 582 F.3d 896, 902-07 (9th Cir.
2009) (applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a civil RICO action but finding that, in contrast to
Sosa, the sham exception applies); Menjivar v. Trophy Props. IV DE, LLC, No. C 06-03086 SI, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76245, at *45-50 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) (following Sosa in applying the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to a RICO civil action). But cf Warnock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
5:08cv0l-DCB-JMR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81507, at *24-25 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 14, 2008) (declining to
follow Sosa's lead in applying Noerr-Pennington to a civil RICO action until directed to do so by the
Fifth Circuit).
328. The potential for a chilling effect is actually greater under RICO than antitrust law, as the
stigma of being labeled a "racketeer" has no analog in the antitrust setting. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
329. This "objectively baseless" standard helps explain why employers' filings of RICO extortion
lawsuits should not be similarly protected. The issue for employers' RICO claims is not whether the
lawsuits themselves violate a federal statute (as was charged with respect to harassing lawsuits being
evidence of antitrust violations or unfair labor practices). Rather, the issue is whether these employer
lawsuits should survive a motion to dismiss. The arguments set forth in Part IV are meant to
demonstrate the employers' claims are without foundation as a matter of law and therefore entirely
dismissible.
330. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511, 513 (1972); id. at 518
(Stewart, J., concurring); Prof'I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
70-73 (1993) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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access to an agency or court, or as part of an effort to put the competitor out
of business, might not be immunized under Noerr-Pennington even if one
or two meritless claims would be. 331 The Court's later "sham litigation"
cases do not seem entirely consistent with this distinction,332 but the
concept lingers that where an extended campaign of harassment is
involved, the whole may exceed the sum of its parts.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of regulatory harassment in
the Wilkie decision.333 As summarized in Part III, the plaintiff in Wilkie
alleged that a coordinated campaign by federal officials, aimed at extorting
from him an easement across his land, was a violation of RICO and an
unconstitutional denial of due process. 334 The agency officials' campaign
featured an extensive set of administrative actions and lawsuits-a form of
regulatory harassment that closely parallels petitioning activities often
pursued by unions in their campaigns. Justice Souter for the majority
expressly recognized the need to examine the government's course of
dealing as a whole, on the theory that "death by a thousand cuts" might be
actionable even if incidents considered individually would not be.335
In that setting, the Wilkie majority emphasized two points that seem
directly relevant to union campaigns. First, the Court's approach to
assessing the campaign as a whole was essentially to determine whether the
bulk of the antagonistic actions engaged in by the government should be
deemed "legitimate tactics designed to improve the Government's
negotiating position" 336 or "illegal action plainly going beyond hard
bargaining." 337 The majority's application of this standard-concluding
331. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. See also Fed. Prescription Serv. Inc. v. Am. Pharm.
Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 261-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (analyzing an alleged multiyear conspiracy to lobby,
boycott, and sue the plaintiff out of existence).
332. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at
60-61 (discussing the objective baselessness test for sham litigation without referencing differences
between single and multiple or repetitive claims); BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 529-32
(2002) (same). But see USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa City Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31
F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the Columbia Pictures Industries test for sham
litigation applies only to single instances while the California Motor Transport approach applies if the
defendant is accused of bringing a series of sham legal actions). The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that
where fifteen of twenty-nine allegedly meritless legal actions proved successful, this success rate
precludes a finding of a sham litigation campaign. Id. at 811. The court's focus on successful litigation
is in some tension with the Supreme Court's subsequent discussion of how a whole class of
unsuccessful lawsuits will not be a sham so long as a substantial proportion of them involved genuine
grievances. See BE&K, 536 U.S. at 532.
333. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
334. Id. at 548-49. See also supra text accompanying notes 215-26.
335. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555.
336. Id. at 557.
337. Id. at 559-60.
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that the campaign involved predominantly actions falling within the
government's authorized enforcement powers-was hotly disputed by
Justice Ginsburg in dissent.338 But regardless of how this approach plays
out in particular cases, the Court's announced standard focusing on the
predominant character of a regulatory offensive indicates that a small
number of illegal actions cannot transform a prolonged campaign involving
mostly lawful exercises of power into actionable government extortion.339
Similarly, a small handful of objectively baseless agency filings or several
instances of violence during a protest should not be sufficient as a matter of
law to taint an otherwise legitimate union campaign lasting months or
years. 340
Second, the Wilkie majority expressed deep concern about the
negative consequences for government interests if federal regulators were
exposed to causes of action for extortion arising out of their enforcement
efforts.34' In refusing to recognize either a constitutional cause of action or
a civil RICO action, the Court elaborated on the chilling effect that would
accompany allowing such claims to survive dismissal:
It is not just final judgments, but the fear of criminal charges or civil
claims for treble damages that could well take the starch out of regulators
who are supposed to bargain and press demands vigorously on behalf of
the Government and the public. This is the reason we would want to see
some text in the Hobbs Act before we could say that Congress meant to
go beyond the common law preoccupation with official corruption, to
embrace the expansive notion of extortion Robbins urges on us.342
Again by analogy, the fear of RICO treble damages is what can "take the
starch out of' union efforts to press vigorously their lawful demands for
neutrality, card check, or collective bargaining agreements.343
It might be argued that the Court's approach to reviewing civil
liability exposure with respect to a government campaign of regulatory
harassment is not instructive when assessing liability exposure for a
338. See id. at 578-80 & n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Lawrence H. Tribe, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2006-2007 CATO
SuP. CT. REV. 23, 29, 55 n.132.
339. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 559-61.
340. This predominant character standard, although not well developed in the Wilkie majority
opinion, bears some resemblance to the Court's statement in BE&K that if a "substantial proportion" of
unsuccessful suits filed involve genuine (rather than baseless) grievances, the class of lawsuits itself
deserves protection. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
341. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561.
342. Id. at 567.
343. See id.
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comprehensive campaign orchestrated by a union. Deciding whether to
expand the implied constitutional cause of action at stake in Wilkie raises
distinct issues from those involved when construing an express statutory
cause of action under RICO.34 4 More generally, executive branch officials'
access to a range of constitutional and common law immunities implicates
policy considerations that have no obvious parallel with respect to
harassing conduct by private actors.345 On reflection, however, the Wilkie
framework still carries considerable weight when transferred to the union
campaign setting.
346
The Court in Wilkie decided to protect from liability a "perpetrator" of
regulatory harassment possessing resources and powers vastly
disproportionate to the campaign's target or "victim." The federal
government brings to the table virtually unlimited resources to support its
campaign and also brings a unique capacity to perform as investigator,
prosecutor, and adjudicator in regulatory proceedings. By contrast, a labor
union as campaign perpetrator is a private entity typically taking on a major
corporate actor. The union lacks the government's direct powers of
investigation or enforcement, and it is likely to possess no more than
comparable resources and strength relative to the campaign's corporate
target. A standard immunizing the enormously powerful federal
344. See, e.g., id. at 568 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., concurring) (expressing commitment to
imposing strict limits on new causes of action for the violation of constitutional amendments under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
345. These considerations include the concern that harassment due to unfounded or costly
litigation will deflect government officials from the energetic performance of their public duties or
compromise their independent judgment in fulfilling those duties. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (discussing qualified immunity from actions alleging constitutional or statutory
violations); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1959) (discussing absolute immunity against
common law tort actions). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (discussing
common law immunity for judges, prosecutors, and grand jurors).
346. The Wilkie framework is not the only analogy available. One could borrow from Title VII
case law establishing that hostile work environment sexual harassment requires "severe or pervasive"
actions-something more than occasional boorish, sexist behavior. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993). See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995). The
analogy to hostile work environment claims under Title VII is less persuasive, however, because there
the individual incidents themselves constitute discriminatory conduct; they simply do not rise to the
level of "alter[ing] the conditions of [the victim's] employment and [thereby] creat[ing] an abusive
working environment." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982)). See also Rebecca Hanner
White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1123, 1128-29, 1134-35, 1159 (1998)
(discussing justifications for a de minimis threshold and describing extensive circuit court reliance on a
de minimis standard in Title VII cases, including hostile work environment settings). By contrast, the
campaign in Wilkie, like the typical union campaign, involved predominantly incidents that are entirely
lawful and even protected, rather than objectionable but only in a de minimis way. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at
543-47, 555-57.
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government for a regulatory crusade that includes only isolated or atypical
instances of misconduct would seem to apply at least as persuasively to a
campaign coordinated by a far less potent labor union that features
similarly infrequent examples of illegal conduct-again, so long as the bulk
of the union campaign rests on lawful tactics.
The Court in Wilkie also shielded from liability a federal government
campaign whose ultimate goal was quite controversial in public policy
terms. The government essentially was seeking a free easement; the
individual landowner would have negotiated over compensation for such an
easement, but the BLM wanted no bargaining at all.347 By contrast, the
union's aim in a typical comprehensive campaign is more mainstream-to
bargain for an agreement, not to demand what is tantamount to a takeover
of property rights. Applying the Wilkie standard to union campaigns that
pursue a negotiated solution would seem if anything less troubling than
utilizing that standard for government campaigns that essentially demand a
unilateral concession.
Finally, the union's hard bargaining strategy is part of a commitment
to furthering legitimate government objectives, analogous in relevant
respects to the law enforcement activities safeguarded under Wilkie.
Admittedly, the Court in Wilkie expressed concerns on a very broad
scale-it worried that allowing a Bivens cause of action would open the
floodgates of litigation by "invit[ing] claims in every sphere of legitimate
governmental action affecting property interests." 348 But as the dissent
noted, the Court in prior cases had not considered "floodgates" to litigation
a special factor that counseled against implying a Bivens action.3 49 In this
context, that the Court unanimously expressed concern over the special
chill accompanying RICO civil actions against government officials 350
likely contributed to the majority's willingness to invoke the floodgates
factor for the first time.
The special RICO chill is also relevant when it comes to the specter of
employer claims alleging extortion against union comprehensive
campaigns. As noted above, these campaigns typically impose intense
347. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 542-43 (describing the government's refusal to negotiate
compensation); id. at 569 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
government's vindictive effort "to extract property from [Robbins] without paying a fair price").
348. Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
349. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Natalie Banta, Note,
Death by a Thousand Cuts or Hard Bargaining?: How the Court's Indecision in Wilkie v. Robbins
Improperly Eviscerates the Bivens Action, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 119, 136 (2008-2009).
350. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 567. See also supra text accompanying note 343.
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economic pressure on employers "through channels outside the immediate
employee-employer relationship" 351 with the ultimate goal of obtaining
agreements that will improve terms and conditions of employment. While
they do not implicate "every sphere of legitimate ... action" 352 as in
Wilkie, the campaigns do seek to vindicate core objectives within one
major sphere of governmental activity-federal regulation of labor-
management relations. Congress in the NLRA declared as "the policy of
the United States" that protecting workers' "full freedom of association"
and "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining"
would enhance the free flow of commerce by, among other things,
augmenting the wage rates and purchasing power of American workers.
353
The threat of RICO extortion actions continues to chill these legitimate and
protected union activities, just as the Court in Wilkie feared such a threat
would chill government efforts at law enforcement.
Moreover, comprehensive campaigns have assumed special strategic
importance in today's complex American workplace as unions seek to
vindicate the federal policy commitment to workers' freedom of
association and the practice of collective bargaining. Since the early 1980s,
technological innovation, global competition, and the mobility of capital
have helped produce a sharp decline in centralized firm decisionmaking
and integrated firm structure. 354 Subcontracted or compartmentalized
production, outsourcing of work to offshore facilities, and automated
information technology all contribute to a dynamic and decentralized labor
market. Unions seeking to represent workers effectively in this market must
engage multiple constituencies in diverse ways if they are to persuade or
pressure employers to reach agreements. Until the federal courts make clear
that such efforts at extended engagement do not as a matter of law
constitute attempted extortion, unions will be deterred from acting to
promote worker interests in the most effective ways allowed under current
federal labor law.
351. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (discussed supra note 245).
352. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561.
353. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
354. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 4-6 (1990); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the
Workplace: The Contemporary Regime ofIndividual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 313, 313-
14 (2007). See also KOCHAN, KATZ & MCKERSIE, supra note 27, at 51-58 (describing the emergence
of a large nonunion sector starting in 1960s, due to changes in economic environment, technological
capacities, and managerial values).
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V. CONCLUSION
Textualist judges and scholars typically warn against allowing reliance
on legislative history to expand the actual or ordinary meaning of enacted
text. 355 The interpretive evolution of RICO reveals an intriguingly different
story, as the Supreme Court initially ignored or rejected legislative record
evidence that would have supported a substantial narrowing of civil RICO
coverage.356 Subsequently, the Court has continued to ignore RICO's
"narrowing" legislative history-both from its 1970 origins and from
congressional reforms proposed during the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless,
the Justices have developed a distinctly more constraining approach to civil
RICO in their second generation of cases.
In light of these circumstances, especially the decisions in Scheidler II
and Wilkie, this Article has attempted to explain why RICO extortion
claims should be adjudicated as fundamentally inapposite with respect to
union comprehensive campaigns. This is not an argument that RICO is
irrelevant for ordinary union activity in general. Questions involving the
scope of labor law preemption or the applicability of other predicate
offense claims are for another day.35 7 Similarly, there has been no effort to
address extortion allegations in which the union's conduct involves a
predominant use of violence or other physically intimidating force.
RICO extortion claims against union campaigns that are built around
regulatory offensives and negative publicity have been a central element of
employer resistance for more than twenty years. While the Court has made
clear that both labor organizations and companies have a right to use
litigation as part of their efforts to secure an economic advantage, that right
should not extend to causes of action that are deemed inadequate as a
matter of law. Quite apart from the Court's recent forays into the nature of
355. See, e.g., Bank One Chi. N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 281 (1996)
(Scalia, J. concurring) (criticizing use of legislative history as "capable of injecting into a statute an
'intent' that its text alone does not express"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994) (criticizing legislative history's
focus on imputed intent that "denies to the drafters the ability to choose rules, with their gains, their
pains, and their limited scope"). See also Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive
Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 957, 980-81
(2007) (contending that liberal judges in the late 1970s and 1980s relied on legislative history to justify
expansive readings of civil rights text enacted in 1964).
356. See supra notes 64-128 and accompanying text.
357. See Monterey Plaza Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Local 483, Hotel Employees Union, 215 F.3d 923,
925-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing allegations that union activities amounted to mail and wire fraud);
Nathan Newman, The Conflict of the Courts: RICO, Labor, and Legal Preemption in Union
Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 307 (2003) (discussing labor law preemption issues).
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federal pleading standards,358 the course of conduct that typically
characterizes a union comprehensive campaign simply does not qualify as
extortionate.
In the past several years, we have seen considerable debate, inside and
outside of Congress, about the need for major labor law reform.359 Such a
debate is overdue following six decades of congressional inaction and
gridlock.360 Still, labor law reform, however broadly conceived, cannot
address all the current controversies over statutory meaning that implicate
protected activity under the NLRA. The chilling effect of RICO extortion
claims on lawful hard bargaining by unions is one such controversy that the
federal courts-and if necessary the Supreme Court-are in a position to
resolve.
358. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51 (2009) (requiring that factual pleadings
plausibly-not just conceivably-give rise to an entitlement to relief); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (requiring the complaint to state "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence" of the alleged illegal activity); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2010) (contending for a new pleading standard in order to
"reconcile Twombly and lqbal with binding pre-Twombly authority").
359. See, e.g., S. 560, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (proposed amendment to the NLRA); H.R. 1409, 111 th
Cong. (2009) (same); Harry C. Alford, EFCA Will Hurt Black-Owned Business Growth, ROLL CALL,
Apr. 20, 2009 (discussing the National Black Chamber of Commerce's concern over the Employee Free
Choice Act); Ray Marshall & Robert Reich, In Need of Real Labor Reform, CHIC. TRIB., June 14, 2009,
at C25 (discussing debate surrounding the Employee Free Choice Act); Harold Meyerson, Card Check
and Gut Check, WASH. POST, May 14,2009, at A19 (same).
360. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 CoMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221,228-31 (2005); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1532-40.
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